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Propaganda warfare, while novel in nomenclature, is far from new in 
practice. In an era dominated by constant news,  battles for public opinion 
complement physical attacks.
1
In fact, “winning modern wars is as much 
dependent on carrying domestic and international public opinion as it is on 
defeating the enemy on the battlefield.”
2
The fight for public opinion has 
become so valuable to military initiatives that the U.S. Department of De-
fense Law of War Manual specifically recognizes propaganda directed to-
wards “civilian or neutral audiences” as a “permissible means of war.”
3
While propaganda warfare on public opinion was once reserved for mil-
itary use against state enemies, governments have recently adapted this tac-
tic to target judicial entities seeking to prosecute violations of international 
criminal laws. State leaders have begun using social media, press state-
ments, and televised conferences to spread disinformation in efforts to de-
monize entities, like international courts, for investigating and prosecuting 
their state nationals. And while the precise means of disseminating this 
propaganda varies by state, the motivation behind the attacks is the same: to 
convert public opinion against the targeted court to prevent the prosecution 
of state officials and military leaders. Within the context of the International 
Criminal Court (“ICC”), this article defines propaganda warfare as states 
* Sara L. Ochs is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Louisville, Louis 
D. Brandeis School of Law. This article was greatly improved by the comments and feedback 
provided by my colleagues at Brandeis Law, as well as the participants of the 2020 Chicago-
land Junior Scholars Conference, the American Society of International Law 2020 Midyear 
Meeting Research Forum, and the 2021 Association of American Law Schools Annual Meet-
ing’s New Voices in Human Rights Panel, especially Professors Stuart Ford, David Stewart, 
Zachary Kaufman, Andrew Keane Woods, and Jeffrey Omari. I would also like to express my 
sincere gratitude to my inimitable research assistant, Amber Cain. 
1. Laurie R. Blank, Media Warfare, Propaganda, and the Law of War, in CYBER 
WARFARE, MEDIA WARFARE, AND LAWFARE 88, 88 (Michael L. Gross & Tamar Meisels 
eds., 2017) (recognizing that “battle[s] of words” pertaining to legality and legitimacy of mili-
tary action “often seem to be as important as military capabilities”).
2. Kenneth Payne, The Media as an Instrument of War, U.S. ARMY WAR COLL. Q.:
PARAMETERS, Spring 2005, at 81, 81.
3. OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF 
WAR MANUAL, 331 art. 5.26.1-1.2 (2016), https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs
/DoD%20Law%20of%20War%20Manual%20-%20June%202015%20Updated%20Dec%
202016.pdf?ver=2016-12-13-172036-190 [hereinafter “DoD Law of War Manual”].
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leaders’ systematic and highly publicized use of anti-ICC rhetoric and disin-
formation about the ICC, its functions, and its jurisdictional reach.
The ICC is by no means the only international entity to bear the brunt of 
propaganda warfare. However, the ICC, as a treaty-based court lacking an 
enforcement mechanism, is critically dependent on public legitimacy and 
state support.
4
Without this support, the ICC bears little chance of satisfac-
torily completing its mandate to hold individuals accountable “for the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.”
5
In-
deed, a widespread lack of public legitimacy in recent years has repeatedly 
precluded the ICC from achieving case-specific goals.
6
As a court founded 
upon state support, attacks aimed to deprive the ICC of legitimacy in the 
eyes of its state supporters are particularly damaging. In ratifying the Rome 
Statute, which established the ICC, states voluntarily forfeited a portion of 
their state sovereignty and permitted the ICC to hold their nationals, includ-
ing their government leaders, accountable. Yet, as a direct result of this con-
sent-based system, states retain significant involvement and control over 
ICC operations, and the ICC is critically dependent on states’ cooperation.
7
Historically, investigations without state support have proven especially 
challenging for the ICC, and on a rudimentary level, the ICC’s success in 
any particular case can often be linked to the level of State cooperation it 
received in investigating that matter.
8
Successful propaganda wars against the ICC, such as the Kenyan Gov-
ernment’s widespread campaign labeling the ICC as a neo-colonialist re-
gime, have proven debilitating for the ICC. What started as a strategy to 
avoid the prosecution of high-ranking Kenyan state leaders, prompted a 
widespread anti-ICC movement supported by the African Union that ulti-
mately resulted in the withdrawal of several African states from the Rome 
4. Valerie Oosterveld, Mike Perry & John McManus, The Cooperation of States with 
the International Criminal Court, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 767, 767 (2002).
5. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, pmbl., July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
6. Yvonne M. Dutton, Bridging the Legitimacy Divide: The International Criminal 
Court’s Domestic Perception Challenge, 56 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 71, 76 (2017). See
generally Gwen P. Barnes, The International Criminal Court’s Ineffective Enforcement 
Mechanisms: The Indictment of President Omar al Bashir, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1584 
(2011) (explaining how states’ failure to arrest Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir while pre-
sent on their state territory undermined the International Criminal Court’s (“ICC’s”) prosecu-
tion of Sudanese crimes against humanity).
7. Oosterveld et al., supra note 4, at 767 (foreshadowing that the ICC’s success 
would “be determined by the level of cooperation it receives from States”).
8. ASP 2017: State Cooperation Crucial for an Effective ICC, COAL. FOR INT’L CRIM.
CT. (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/news/20171107/asp-2017-state-
cooperation-crucial-effective-icc#:~:text=With%20no%20enforcement%20mechanism%20of,
to%20cooperate%20with%20the%20ICC (highlighting the detrimental impact on investiga-
tions of state non-cooperation by explaining the challenges the ICC Prosecutor has faced in 
investigating crimes within the Situation in Darfur, Sudan).
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Statute. At the time of publication, the ICC is still working to distance itself 
from claims of discrimination against African nations.
9
The impact of these propaganda wars runs deeper than mere public im-
age. Often, the use of propaganda and disinformation, combined with the 
ICC’s critical need for state support and cooperation, is sufficient to coerce 
the ICC to reach a certain ruling or to redirect its limited resources to a dif-
ferent issue. Propaganda wars that are successful in provoking the ICC to 
dismiss claims against high-profile leaders inject the appearance of bias into 
ICC operations and inspire other states to act against the Court to prevent 
investigations into their nationals. The most influential states on the geopo-
litical stage are also the states with the most influence on global perception.
These states include the United States, Russia, and China, all of whom re-
fused to join the ICC out of fear of the infringement of their sovereignty. 
These states also hold permanent status and veto power on the United Na-
tions Security Council and are therefore influential in situations where the 
Security Council refers non-States Parties to the ICC.
10
And, as seen recent-
ly by the United States’ vitriolic response to the ICC’s opening of an inves-
tigation into crimes committed in Afghanistan, which threatens to implicate 
U.S. officials, powerful states will aggressively utilize propaganda and dis-
information to prevent the ICC from prosecuting their or their allies’ nation-
als.
11
These propaganda wars, and the ICC’s vulnerability to them, thus car-
ry the risk of exacerbating already significant power disparities in the field 
of international criminal justice. They further represent the danger that the 
ICC will become a court that exclusively tries perpetrators from nations too 
powerless to fight back, while leaving superpowers, like the United States 
and China, immune from prosecution for atrocities committed on their soil 
and by their nationals.
Many scholars have addressed the pervasive role politics plays in the 
ICC’s operations,
12
and a significant body of scholarship has explored the 
9. See generally Geoff Dancy, Yvonne Marie Dutton, Tessa Alleblas & Eamon 
Aloyo, What Determines Perceptions of Bias Toward the International Criminal Court? Evi-
dence from Kenya, 64(7-8) J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1443 (2019) (recognizing ongoing percep-
tions of anti-African bias in the ICC). 
10. The UN Security Council, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Sept. 16, 2020), 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/un-security-council (noting that the United States, Russia, 
and China are permanent members of the UN Security Council and thus hold the power to 
veto any Security Council resolution); Alexandre Skander Galand, The Nature of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court and its Amended Jurisdictional Scheme, 17 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 933, 937–38 (2020) (discussing the role of the Security Council in referring 
situations to the ICC that generally fall outside of its territorial jurisdiction).
11. See infra Part IV.
12. See generally OUMAR BA, STATES OF JUSTICE: THE POLITICS OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (2020) (exploring the relationship between weaker States 
Parties and the ICC, and the intersection of power and politics); Christof Royer, The Bête 
Noire and the Noble Lie: The International Criminal Court and (the Disavowal of) Politics,
13 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 225 (2019) (presenting the ICC as a political actor).
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importance of legitimacy in ICC functions.
13
However, the use of propagan-
da warfare, in the form of disinformation and anti-ICC campaigns, and its 
impact on public opinion—which lies at the crossroads between politics and 
legitimacy—has been largely unexplored.
14
This article seeks to fill that gap 
by examining the extent to which propaganda wars impact the ICC’s deci-
sions and operations. Notably, this article is not intended to read as a cri-
tique of how the ICC and its Prosecutor have handled politically sensitive 
situations in the past. Nor is it intended to provide a comprehensive over-
view of every propaganda war leveled against the ICC.
15
Rather, through the 
use of two case studies—those of the Kenyan and United States govern-
ments—it aims to identify the extent to which the ICC has had to modify its 
operations in order to sustain the public legitimacy necessary to fulfill its 
mandate.
This article argues that the effective use of propaganda warfare against 
the ICC has the potential to destroy the ICC’s ability to effectively investi-
gate and prosecute the crimes of most concern to the international commu-
nity. It further suggests that in order to successfully defend against propa-
ganda attacks, like those orchestrated by the Kenyan and United States gov-
governments, the ICC must adapt its approach to state relations to foster 
knowledge of, support for, and cooperation with the ICC’s goals and prose-
cutorial strategies. The article ultimately seeks to identify workable pro-
posals for the ICC and its Prosecutor to strengthen the ICC’s perceived le-
gitimacy among states parties and non-states parties alike, so as to minimize 
the detrimental impact posed by state propaganda.
Part II of this article will identify the foundational characteristics of the
ICC that render propaganda wars so consequential to its operations, espe-
13. See, e.g., Margaret M. deGuzman, Gravity and the Legitimacy of the International 
Criminal Court, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1400 (2009); Stuart Ford, A Social Psychology Mod-
el of the Perceived Legitimacy of International Criminal Courts: Implications for the Success 
of Transitional Justice Mechanisms, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 405 (2012).
14. See Harry M. Rhea & Ryan C. Meldrum, United States Public Support for the In-
ternational Criminal Court: A Multivariate Analysis of Attitudes and Attributes, 37 U. PA. J.
INT’L L. 739, 741 (2015) (noting that “little has been written on public opinion and the ICC”).
15. Specifically, this paper will not discuss the ongoing propaganda war being fought 
by the Philippines in response to the ICC Prosecutor’s propio motu preliminary examination 
into President Rodrigo Duterte’s “war on drugs.” See The Philippines’ Membership in the ICC 
Comes to an End, COAL. FOR INT’L CRIM. CT. (Mar. 15, 2019), 
http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/news/20190315/philippines-leaves-icc (explaining how the 
Philippines withdrew from the Rome Statute as part of its propaganda campaign against the 
Court). Nor will it analyze in detail Israel’s current battle in response to the Prosecutor’s in-
vestigation into crimes committed in Palestine. See Jeffrey Heller, Netanyahu Accuses ICC of 
Anti-Semitism in Pursuit of War Crimes Probe, REUTERS (Dec. 22, 2019), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-icc-palestinians-israel/netanyahu-accuses-icc-of-anti-
semitism-in-pursuit-of-war-crimes-probe-idUSKBN1YQ0KC (recognizing Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu’s accusation that the ICC is anti-Semitic in response to the Prosecutor’s
preliminary examination in Palestine).
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cially its reliance on state cooperation and its susceptibility to political pres-
sures.
Part III will examine how the Kenyan Government’s highly publicized 
response to the ICC cases against William Ruto and Uhuru Kenyatta mar-
shalled public opinion against the ICC both within Kenya and throughout 
the African Union. Next, it will analyze how this campaign not only pres-
sured the ICC into dismissing the charges against the two high profile de-
fendants, but also sparked a regional revolution of public opinion against the 
ICC, the effects of which are still very apparent today.
Part IV will explore the United States’ ongoing propaganda war against 
the ICC instituted in response to the Prosecutor’s opening of an investiga-
tion into war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Afghani-
stan. It will specifically analyze the extent to which a non-State Party super-
power can bully the ICC into authoring favorable opinions by combining an 
anti-ICC public opinion campaign with a lack of investigatory cooperation. 
It will further consider the potentially devastating legacy that this may have 
on the ICC.
Part V argues that cultivating greater perceived legitimacy of the ICC, 
both within and outside its States Parties, will provide the ICC with some 
immunity from attempted propaganda wars. Specifically, it advocates for 
more significant, sustained public outreach to foster knowledge and respect 
for the ICC; the ICC’s enhancement of its public image; and the implemen-
tation of punitive consequences for States Parties who fail to comply with 
ICC investigations.
II.  The ICC’s Susceptibility to Propaganda
Given the unique foundations upon which the ICC is grounded, the ICC 
is especially vulnerable to both political pressures and widespread public 
opinion. By signing the Rome Statute, each State Party provided the ICC 
with jurisdiction over core crimes—genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, and the crime of aggression
16
—committed on their state territory or 
by their nationals elsewhere in the world.
17
The Rome Statute does not rec-
ognize sovereign immunity, meaning that high-ranking governmental offi-
cials, including heads of state, may be subject to ICC investigation and 
prosecution.
18
16. The term “core crimes” pertains to the four categories of crimes listed in article 5 of 
the Rome Statute. Christine Schwöbel-Patel, The Core Crimes of International Criminal Law, 
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 769, 769–70 (Kevin Jon 
Heller, Frédéric Mégret, Sarah M. H. Nouwen, Jens David Ohlin & Darryl Robinson eds., 
2020).
17. Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 12, ¶¶ 1–2; Yvonne M. Dutton, Explaining State 
Commitment to the International Criminal Court: Strong Enforcement Mechanisms as a 
Credible Threat, 10 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 477, 478 (2011).
18. Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 27; see also Paul J. Toner, Competing Concepts of 
Immunity: The (R)evolution of the Head of State Immunity Defense, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV.
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So long as other jurisdictional requirements are met,
19
the ICC may be-
come apprised of a particular matter through three different means.
20
First, a 
State Party may refer a situation occurring in its own territory or in the terri-
tory of another State Party.
21
Second, and most controversially, the ICC 
Prosecutor may, on its own propio motu authority vested under article 15 of 
the Rome Statute, and with approval by the Pre-Trial Chamber, initiate in-
vestigations into certain situations.
22
Under both of these methods, the ICC’s 
jurisdiction is geographically limited to crimes committed on the territory or 
by a national of a State Party.
23
Third, the United Nations Security Council 
may refer situations to the Prosecutor under authority provided by Chapter 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
24
For situations opened pursuant to 
Security Council referral, the ICC’s jurisdiction is not geographically lim-
ited. The Security Council may refer a matter involving crimes committed 
anywhere or by anyone in the world, regardless of whether these crimes 
were committed on the territory of a non-State Party or by a non-State Party 
national.
25
The ICC is a court of limited jurisdiction and a self-recognized “court 
of last resort,”
26
meaning it will only step in to prosecute crimes that a state 
lacks either the means or desire to prosecute.
27
  This concept, recognized as 
the principle of complementarity, is codified in the Rome Statute and pro-
vides that a case will be deemed inadmissible before the ICC when it is “in-
vestigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it unless the 
State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or pros-
ecution,” or when it has been investigated by a State, and the State decided 
not to prosecute, “unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or in-
899, 901 (2004) (recognizing that the Rome Statute does not provide for a Head of State im-
munity defense).
19. Article 11 also limits the ICC’s jurisdiction to crimes committed after the entry into 
force of the Statute. Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 11; see also Christian M. De Vos, The 
International Criminal Court: Between Law and Politics in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
IN CONTEXT 240, 243 (Philipp Kastner ed. 2018) (discussing the jurisdictional limitations im-
posed by the Rome Statute).
20. Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 13.
21. Id. art. 14.
22. Id. art. 15.
23. Id. art. 12(2).
24. Id. art. 13(b).
25. Oona A. Hathaway, Paul K. Strauch, Beatrice A. Walton & Zoe A. Y. Weinberg, 
What is a War Crime? 44 YALE J. INT’L L. 53, 95 (2019); Galand, supra note 10.
26. About the International Criminal Court, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int
/about (last visited Jan. 5, 2021).
27. Id.; see also Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 1 (recognizing that the ICC “shall be 
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions”). Additionally, the ICC will only deem situ-
ations to be admissible that do not rise to a level of “sufficient gravity to justify further action 
by the Court.” Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 17(1)(d).
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ability of the State genuinely to prosecute.”
28
The principle is intended to 
recognize the ICC’s respect for states’ primary jurisdiction.
29
And while 
measures like the ICC’s limited jurisdiction and the principle of comple-
mentarity are designed to facilitate voluntary state involvement in the ICC, 
the ICC has routinely struggled to balance two fundamental weaknesses: its 
extreme reliance on the cooperation of its States Parties and its susceptibil-
ity to political pressure from States Parties and non-States Parties alike.
A. Reliance on State Cooperation
Nearly two decades after the ICC’s creation in 2002, 123 nations rati-
fied the Rome Statute and became States Parties to the ICC.
30
States Parties’ 
obligation to cooperate fully with the ICC’s investigations and prosecutions 
of crimes is expressly codified in the Rome Statute.
31
This obligation ex-
tends through all stages of investigation and court proceedings and requires 
states to, among other things, perform provisional arrests,
32
facilitate the ap-
pearance of witnesses and experts in court, execute searches and seizures, 
provide witness and victim protection, and question suspects.
33
This re-
quested level of cooperation is especially vital, as the ICC lacks a typical 
enforcement mechanism. It has no police force or military unit by which to 
enforce its judgments, warrants, or summons, and as such, the ICC “de-
pends on the political will of countries to cooperate with the ICC.”
34
As 
former ICC Judge Hans-Peter Kaul accurately summarized in a 2011 key-
note address, “[t]he ICC is absolutely, one hundred percent, dependent on 
effective cooperation with States Parties.”
35
28. Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 17(1)(a)–(b.).
29. XABIER AGIRRE, ANTONIO CASSESE, ROLF EINAR FIFE, HÅKAN FRIMAN,
CHRISTOPHER K. HALL, JOHN T. HOLMES, JANN KLEFFNER, HECTOR OLASOLO, NORUL H.
RASHID, DARRYL ROBINSON, ELIZABETH WILMSHURST & ANDREAS ZIMMERMANN,
INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER: THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY IN PRACTICE 3 (2003), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/20BB4494-70F9-4698-8E30-907F631453ED/281984
/complementarity.pdf. The complementarity principle also seeks to promote the effectiveness 
and efficiency of investigations and prosecutions, because states are often in the best position 
to prosecute given their access to evidence and witnesses. De Vos, supra note 19, at 241.
30. The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://asp.icc-cpi.int
/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20
statute.aspx (last visited Aug. 27, 2020).
31. Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 86.
32. Id. art. 92.
33. Id. art. 93(1).
34. Danial Kaysi & Charles Faint, Political Will and Multilateral Cooperation in Inter-
national Justice: An Interview with Richard Goldstone, 7 YALE J. INT’L AFFS. 90, 91 (2012); 
see Roy S. Lee, States’ Responses: Issues and Solutions, in STATES’ RESPONSES TO ISSUES 
ARISING FROM THE ICC STATUTE: CONSTITUTIONAL, SOVEREIGNTY, JUDICIAL 
COOPERATION AND CRIMINAL LAW 1 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2005).
35. H.E. Judge Dr. jur. h. c. Hans-Peter Kaul, Second Vice President Int’l Crim. Ct., 
Keynote: The International Criminal Court—Current Challenges and Perspectives 8 (Aug. 8, 
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If a State Party fails to comply with a request from the ICC to cooper-
ate, pursuant to Rome Statute article 87, the ICC may refer the State Party to 
the Assembly of States Parties or the Security Council, in the event the non-
compliance occurs within the context of a Security-Council referred mat-
ter.
36
Yet, the Rome Statute lacks any defined repercussions that may com-
plement this type of referral.
37
Thus, while article 87 appears to carry a 
heavy punishment, its bark has proven far worse than its bite, and the actual 
consequences faced by non-compliant parties have essentially been limited 
to public shaming.
38
As the prolific ICC expert Judge Richard Goldstone has 
noted, if States Parties refuse to cooperate, “there is nothing the court can do 
other than to make noise.”
39
State cooperation is intrinsically connected to the ICC’s perceived legit-
imacy. Although the term “legitimacy” is often used to broadly refer to 
“generalized acceptability or success,” a vast field of critical scholarship has 
categorized varying areas of legitimacy in the context of international 
courts.
40
And while there is often a disconnect between sociological legiti-
macy—“what people perceive to be morally or legally legitimate”—and 
normative legitimacy—“what really is legally or morally legitimate”41—this 
distinction is well beyond the scope of the present article. This article’s use 
of the term “legitimacy” will refer only to the sociological “perceived legit-
imacy” of the ICC, or how people and states subjectively perceive the legit-
imacy of operations and justifications for the ICC.
42
Despite these highly philosophical underpinnings, the ICC’s need for 
legitimacy is practically evident. States’ “perceptions of the ICC’s legitima-
cy affect their willingness to cooperate with the ICC.”
43
States and their na-
tionals are more willing to support an institution that they believe operates 
fairly and effectively and are less willing to support a court perceived as bi-
2011), https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/289b449a-347d-4360-a854-3b7d0a4b9f06/283740
/010911salzburglawschool.pdf [hereinafter Judge Kaul Keynote Address].
36. Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 87(7).
37. Barnes, supra note 6, at 1616–17.
38. See Nada Ali, Bringing the Guilty to Justice: Can the ICC be Self-Enforcing? 14
CHI. J. INT’L L. 408, 416 (2014) (noting that the Rome Statute lacks an “enforcement bite” to 
compel state cooperation).
39. Kaysi & Faint, supra note 34, at 91.
40. deGuzman, supra note 13, at 1436–37 (identifying three categories of legitimacy: 
legal legitimacy, which anticipates the “correct application of laws and legal principles”; mor-
al legitimacy, which “refers to the moral justifiability of a judicial regime or decision”; and 
sociological legitimacy, which “considers the perceptions of relevant audiences that such re-
gime or decision is justified”).
41. Id. at 1437 (quoting Richard H. Fallon Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1851 (2005)) (emphasis added).
42. Ford, supra note 13, at 406–07 n.1. This specific type of legitimacy falls within the 
broader category of “sociological legitimacy.” See deGuzman, supra note 13, at 1437. 
43. C. Cora True-Frost, Weapons of the Weak: The Prosecutor of the ICC’s Power to 
Engage the UN Security Council, 44 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 261, 315 (2016).
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ased, ineffective, or weak.
44
In democratic states, where governments are—
at least theoretically—guided by their constituents’ needs, public opinion 
and support can directly influence state action on deciding whether to sup-
port an ICC investigation.
B. Vulnerability to Political Pressures
As a treaty-based court designed to mete out international criminal jus-
tice, the ICC is grounded in politics.
45
Since the ICC is designed to impose 
individual criminal liability on those responsible for masterminding crimes 
such as genocide and crimes against humanity, its defendants are often state 
actors and high-ranking governmental officials, thus creating sensitive geo-
political situations.
46
While the ICC is not an organ of the United Nations 
(“U.N.”), it holds close relationships with purely political entities, most no-
tably the U.N. Security Council. The Security Council can refer cases to the 
ICC and even suspend ongoing ICC investigations on any case it deems “a 
threat to international peace and security.”
47
This relationship, along with 
the composition of the ICC’s States Parties and the types of disputes over 
which the ICC has jurisdiction, inherently inserts a level of politics into the 
ICC’s justice agenda.
48
Many scholars have weighed in on the prevalence of politics in ICC op-
erations.
49
While ICC Prosecutors and representatives of the court have re-
44. Dutton, supra note 6, at 85.
45. Treaties and other international agreements require international cooperation by 
their signatories in order to be effective; treaties are only likely to be successful when they 
achieve “political buy-in” from their signatories’ governments. Emily O’Brien & Richard 
Gowan, What Makes International Agreements Work 3 (N.Y.U. Ctr. on Int’l Coop. ed.,
Sept. 2012), https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files
/7839.pdf; see also WILLIAM SCHABAS, UNIMAGINABLE ATROCITIES (2012) (recognizing that 
the “political dimensions [of international criminal justice] are inescapable”).
46. Westen K. Shilaho, The International Criminal Court and the African Union, 18 
AFR. J. ON CONFLICT RESOL. 119 (2018).
47. Benson Chinedu Olugbuo, Law and Politics at the International Criminal Court,
OPEN DEMOCRACY (Aug. 24, 2015), https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/openglobalrights-
openpage/law-and-politics-at-international-criminal-court; see also Beth Van Schaack, De-
constructing Syria’s Would-be International Criminal Court Referral: The Politics of Interna-
tional Justice, 56 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (2020) (explaining that the Rome Statute grants the 
Security Council the ability to refer and defer investigations and cases; compel state coopera-
tion; and “make a determination that a state committed an act of aggression”).
48. BA, supra note 12, at 65–66; see also Olugbuo, supra note 47 (noting that “alt-
hough the ICC is a legal institution, it is surrounded by political actors”).
49. See, e.g., Sascha Dominik, Dov Bachmann & Eda Luke Nwibo, Pull and Push—
Implementing the Complementarity Principle of the Rome Statute of the ICC Within the Afri-
can Union: Opportunities and Challenges, 43 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 457, 520 (2018) (recogniz-
ing that while justice may not be a political tool, it “cannot, in practical terms, be completely 
isolated from the politics of those advancing its cause”); H. Christie, The Poisoned Chalice: 
Imperial Justice, Moral Relativism, and the origins of International Criminal Law, 72 U.
PITT. L. REV. 361, 365 (2010) (opining that political influence is “inherent in the very nature”
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peatedly disavowed the notion that politics plays any role in prosecutorial or 
judicial operations,
50
this apolitical façade is unrealistic. In fact, in a state-
ment now out of character for the outwardly apolitical ICC, Judge Eboe-
Osuji recognized that the view “that international law is capable of operat-
ing in a politically sterile environment implicates amazing naiveté as to how 
life really works.”
51
Given the nature of the crimes, the defendants falling 
within the ICC’s jurisdiction, and the incessant interweaving of government 
involvement in the creation and operations of the ICC, it is disingenuous for 
the field of international criminal law to attempt to remove itself entirely 
from political pressures.
While the ICC boasts a long list of States Parties that carry influence on 
the geopolitical stage, several of those nations who hold the most political 
power over the ICC—The United States, Russia, and China—are absent 
from that list.
52
Although all three nations have been past supporters of in-
ternational criminal justice initiatives, such as ad hoc and hybrid courts de-
signed to prosecute atrocity crimes in countries like Rwanda, the Former 
Yugoslavia, and Cambodia, none have proven willing to join the Rome 
Statute.
53
The reasons for this are unsurprising: As a permanent, treaty-
based international court, the ICC is starkly different from these previous 
courts. The ICC provides far less of a shield against superpowers, and the 
of international criminal law, and it is impossible to divorce justice for war crimes or crimes 
against humanity entirely from the “political element”); BA, supra note 12, at 5 (“[T]he ICC is 
inherently a political institution that makes the distinction between friends and enemies of the 
international community.”).
50. See, e.g., Sarah M. H. Nouwen & Wouter G. Werner, Doing Justice to the Politi-
cal: The International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 941, 942 
(2011) (referencing a keynote address made by former ICC Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-
Ocampo, in which he claimed, “I apply the law without political considerations. But the other 
actors have to adjust to the law.”); Thomas Obel Hansen, The International Criminal Court 
and the Legitimacy of Exercise, in LAW AND LEGITIMACY 5, 7 (Per Andersen, Cecilie 
Eriksen, & Bjarke Viskum eds., 2015) (referring to statements made by the former ICC Presi-
dent in which he noted the absence of a “shred of evidence . . . that the court has done any-
thing political,” and by current ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, in which she claimed “the 
Prosecutor does not take into account any political considerations” in determining whether to 
open an investigation); Benjamin Duerr, Twenty Years On: The ICC and the Politicization of 
its Mechanisms, IPI GLOB. OBSERVATORY (Aug. 7, 2018), https://theglobalobservatory.org
/2018/08/twenty-years-icc-politicization-mechanisms (arguing that while the ICC holds itself 
out as a purely legal and apolitical body, in actuality, it is “carefully balancing the ideal—an
apolitical approach merely based on the law—and a more realistic approach, thus, accommo-
dating the interests of the governments involved”).
51. Hansen, supra note 50, at 13 (quoting Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-01/11-
1334-Anx-Corr, Separate Further Opinion of Judge Eboe-Osuji, ¶ 11 (Oct. 21, 2013)).
52. De Vos, supra note 19, at 253–54.
53. ERNA PARIS, THE SUN CLIMBS SLOW 49–51 (2008) (recognizing U.S. support of 
international criminal justice ventures prior to the Rome Conference, such as the creation of 
the ad hoc tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, as well as the establishment of 
international hybrid tribunals to prosecute atrocities committed in Cambodia, East Timor, and 
Sierra Leone).
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crimes that fall within the Rome Statute’s jurisdiction—genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and aggression—often implicate superpowers 
and their allies.
54
These powerful nations are willing to provide selective 
support of international criminal tribunals so long as the tribunals comple-
ment their national interests, but none are willing to support an initiative by 
which its leaders or government officials may be held accountable.
55
The United States, Russia, and China all serve as permanent members 
of the U.N. Security Council and carry veto power over Security Council 
decisions.
56
Thus, even though each nation has refused to ratify the Rome 
Statute and join the ICC, they nonetheless hold great weight in deciding 
which cases the ICC hears, especially those involving crimes committed on 
non-States Parties’ territories. It should also be noted that non-States Parties, 
including these three nations, have no legal obligation to cooperate with or 
support the ICC.
57
The level of power non-States Parties hold over the ICC is more than 
just theoretical. As Judge Kaul has noted, we live in a “challenging reality” 
in which “powerful States and permanent members of the Security Council .
. . . somehow [instrumentalize] the ICC, to use it for their political purposes 
and interests.”
58
Indeed, to date, the Security Council has referred only two 
situations to the ICC—Darfur and Libya
59
—and China and Russia have re-
peatedly vetoed attempts to refer the situation in Syria.
60
Political maneuver-
ings both within and surrounding the ICC, have come to a head in recent 
years, in large part due to the Prosecutor’s increased use of her propio motu
authority to open cases and the ICC’s expanding reach over cases implicat-
54. See Kaysi & Faint, supra note 34, at 92 (noting the United States perspective that 
“international justice is a great idea for the rest of the world but not such a good idea when it 
comes to home”).
55. Id. at 92 (recognizing Judge Richard Goldston’s view that “The powerful don’t like 
oversight, [they] don’t like being policed . . . [and they] don’t like smaller nations judging 
their military and civilian leaders.”).
56. Voting System, U.N. SEC. COUNCIL, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content
/voting-system (last visited Mar. 14, 2021).
57. Corrina Heyder, The U.N. Security Council’s Referral of the Crimes in Darfur to 
the International Criminal Court in Light of U.S. Opposition to the Court: Implications for the 
International Court’s Functions and Status, 24 BERKLEY J. INT’L L. 650, 654–55 (2006).
58. Judge Kaul Keynote Address, supra note 35, at 9–10; see also Jonathan Paul 
Bracewell, Will it Float? The International Criminal Court Without the United States, 6 
REGENT J. INT’L L. 483, 504 (2008) (explaining that the United States argued for greater Se-
curity Council control over the Court during the negotiations for the Rome Statute so that the 
U.S. could establish lasting control over the Court).
59. In Hindsight: The Security Council and the International Criminal Court, SEC.
COUNCIL REP. (Jul. 31, 2018), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2018-
08/in_hindsight_the_security_council_and_the_international_criminal_court.php.
60. U.N. SCOR, 69th Sess., 7180th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.7180 (May 22, 2014) (re-
flecting China and Russia’s May 22, 2014 veto of resolution to refer the Syrian situation to the 
ICC).
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ing world powers, including the opening of situations into crimes committed 
in Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
III.  The Situation in Kenya
The ICC’s Situation in Kenya is notable for many reasons. It marked 
the first time that a state challenged the admissibility of a case on comple-
mentarity grounds,
61
and it was also the first investigation opened by the 
ICC Prosecutor propio motu.62 This marked a significant shift in the ICC 
and specifically the Prosecutor’s strategy. Up until this point, all of the situ-
ations handled by the ICC, including those in Uganda, the Democratic Re-
public of Congo, and the Central African Republic, had been referred to the 
ICC by the states themselves.
63
As a result, the Prosecutor had prior assur-
ance of some cooperation in conducting its investigations in these self-
referred situations.
64
This radically changed with the Situation in Kenya, 
where Kenyan leaders refused to cooperate and actively sought to under-
mine the Prosecutor’s investigation. This lack of cooperation, complement-
ed by an anti-ICC propaganda war deftly spearheaded by defendants and 
current Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William 
Ruto, resulted in the dismissal of all charges against all named defendants.
65
Not only did propaganda successfully prompt the dismissal of these charges, 
but it ultimately marred the ICC’s legitimacy in Africa and globally, spark-
ing a backlash from which the ICC has yet to fully recover.
A. Background of the Situation in Kenya
The Situation in Kenya stems from violence committed in the wake of 
the country’s December 2007 election. The election, as typical for Kenyan 
political elections,
66
fell along ethnic lines, pitting the incumbent Mwai 
Kibaki, a member of Kenya’s Kikuyu tribe, against Raila Odinga, an ethnic 
61. Christopher Totten, Hina Asghar & Ayomipo Ojutalayo, The ICC Kenya Case: Im-
plications and Impact for Propio Motu and Complementarity, 13 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L.
REV. 699, 700 (2014).
62. Simeon P. Sungi, The Kenyan Cases and the Future of the International Criminal 
Court’s Prosecutorial Policies, 2 AFR. J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 153, 153 (2015). 
63. BA, supra note 12, at 92.
64. Id. at 92.
65. Anjli Parrin, Kenya ICC Case Dismissed for Lack for Evidence, Declared a Mistri-
al, COLUMBIA L. SCH.: HUM. RTS. INST. (Apr. 5, 2016), https://web.law.columbia.edu/human-
rights-institute/news-features/press-releases/kenya-icc-case-dismissed-lack-evidence-
declared-mistrial (noting that the dismissal of the case against Ruto terminated the “sole re-
maining Kenya case” before the Court).
66. BALLOTS TO BULLETS: ORGANIZED POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND KENYA’S CRISIS OF 
GOVERNANCE 17 (Hum. Rts. Watch ed., Mar. 2008), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files
/reports/kenya0308web.pdf [hereinafter BALLOTS TO BULLETS] (recognizing that “the politi-
cal manipulation of ethnicity is almost a tradition in Kenyan politics”).
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rival of Kibaki.
67
Following what appeared to be election rigging to ensure 
Kibaki’s victory,
68
violence—much of which was likely pre-planned—broke 
out throughout Kenya’s Rift Valley.
69
Death squads targeted Kikuyus and 
sparked retaliatory violence.
70
The violence expanded throughout the nation, 
and by its conclusion in February 2008, over 1,000 people had been killed, 
900 were raped or sexually brutalized, 3,500 were seriously injured, and 
350,000 people had been forcibly displaced.
71
In 2008, the Kenyan Government established a Commission of Inquiry 
on Post-Election Violence.
72
In its October 2008 report, following a thor-
ough investigation, the Commission presented its recommendations for 
achieving justice. These included the creation of a special tribunal, a hybrid 
court intended to sit within Kenya with both Kenyan and international judg-
es, investigators, and staff, so as to ensure independent impartiality in the 
tribunal investigations and prosecutions.
73
This proposal stemmed from the 
Commission’s acknowledgment that the governmental institutions within 
Kenya, including the judiciary, “were not impartial and lacked integrity.”
74
In February 2009, the Kenyan Parliament voted against the proposal for a 
special tribunal.
75
The result was not unexpected, as many members of Par-
67. James Verini, The Prosecutor and the President, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/magazine/international-criminal-court-moreno-
ocampo-the-prosecutor-and-the-president.html?smid=tw-share&_r=2.
68. Totten, supra note 61, at 704–05.
69. Id. at 705.
70. Susanne D. Mueller, Kenya and the International Criminal Court (ICC): Politics, 
the Election, and the Law, 8 J. E. AFR. STUD., no. 1, 2014, at 25, 27.
71. Kenya, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/kenya (last visited Aug. 25, 2020). 
As with most periods of extensive violence, the precise calculations of the numbers of indi-
viduals killed, injured, or displaced are in dispute. See, e.g., BALLOTS TO BULLETS, supra
note 66, at 2 (stating that over 1,000 were killed and up to 500,000 internally displaced as a 
result of the post-election violence); Verini, supra note 67 (placing these figures even higher; 
estimating that between 1,100 and 1,200 individuals were killed and a half a million people 
were displaced as a result of the violence).
72. Specifically, the Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence (more common-
ly known as the “Waki Commission”), as well as a Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Com-
mission were created as a product of the power-sharing agreement negotiated by former U.N. 
Secretary General Kofi Annan. Totten, supra note 61, at 706–07; The Kenyan Commission of 
Inquiry into Post-Election Violence, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST.,
https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Kenya-Dialogue-Inquiry-2008-English.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 1, 2020). 
73. TRUTH, JUST., & RECONCILIATION COMM’N, COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY-CIPEV
REPORT (WAKI REPORT) 472–75 (2008), https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/cgi
/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=tjrc-gov [hereinafter WAKI REPORT].
74. Id. at 28.
75. Timeline, INT’L JUST. MONITOR, https://www.ijmonitor.org/kenya-cases-timeline 
(last visited Sept. 8, 2020); Verini, supra note 67.
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liament were believed to have been directly involved in orchestrating the 
violence.
76
In light of Kenya’s failure to create the proposed Special Tribunal or to 
conduct objectively satisfactory domestic trials against those allegedly re-
sponsible for the post-election violence, the Commission delivered its evi-
dence, including a list of suspects implicated in the violence, directly to the 
ICC’s first Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo.
77
Based on this evidence, 
Ocampo chose to open the Situation into the violence on his own authori-
ty.
78
Given that he opened the investigation propio motu, he was obligated 
pursuant to Rome Statute article 15 to first request and obtain authorization 
from the Pre-Trial Chamber to proceed with the investigation,
79
which Pre-
Trial Chamber II granted in March 2010.
80
In March 2011, upon Ocampo’s request, the Pre-Trial Chamber issued a 
summons for six defendants to be tried in two separate cases.
81
Notable 
among the defendants were Uhuru Kenyatta, who served as Kenya’s Deputy 
Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, and who is the son of Kenya’s first 
president,
82
and William Ruto, a Kenyan Parliamentarian.
83
Kenyatta was 
charged, based on allegations that he provided institutional support for the 
post-election violence, with five counts of crimes against humanity for mur-
der, deportation or forcible transfer, rape, persecution, and other inhumane 
acts.
84
Ocampo also charged Ruto as an indirect perpetrator with three 
charges of crimes against humanity for murder, deportation or forcible 
76. Verini, supra note 67.
77. Press Release, Int’l Crim. Ct., Waki Commission List of Names in the Hands of 
ICC Prosecutor (Jul. 16, 2009), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr439; Kenya,
COAL. FOR INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/country/kenya (last visited 
Sept. 1, 2020).
78. Yvonne M. Dutton, Enforcing the Rome Statute: Evidence of (Non) Compliance 
from Kenya, 26 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 7, 12 (2016).
79. Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 15.
80. Press Release, Int’l Crim. Ct., ICC Judges Grant the Prosecutor’s Request to 
Launch an Investigation on Crimes Against Humanity with Regard to the Situation in Kenya
(Mar. 31, 2010), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=icc+judges+grant+the
+prosecutor%E2%80%99s+request+to+launch+an+investigation+on+crimes+a.
81. Mueller, supra note 70, at 27.
82. Kenyatta Case, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/kenya/kenyatta (last visit-
ed Sept. 1, 2020); Uhuru Kenyatta, COAL. FOR INT’L CRIM. CT.,
http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/cases/uhuru-kenyatta (last visited Sept 1, 2020).
83. William Ruto and Joshua Sang, COAL. FOR INT’L CRIM. CT., 
http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/cases/william-ruto-and-joshua-sang (last visited Sept. 1, 
2020). The Court also summoned Henry Kogsey and Joshua Sang to appear alongside Ruto as 
defendants in the first case, which dealt primarily with crimes against humanity committed 
against Kikuyu supporters, and Francis Muthaura and Mohammed Hussein Ali to appear 
alongside Kenyatta in the second case, which concerned the hiring of the Mungiki militia to 
inflict retaliatory violence against non-Kikuyu supporters. Mueller, supra note 70, at 26.
84. Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Case Information Sheet at 1, 
(Mar. 13, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CaseInformationSheets/KenyattaEng.pdf.
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transfer, and persecution for his alleged involvement in organizing and sup-
porting a common plan to forcibly expel Kikuyu supporters and their allies 
from the Rift valley.
85
Prior to Prosecutor Ocampo’s leveling of charges against Kenyatta and 
Ruto, Kenya was largely supportive of the ICC. An Ipsos Kenya poll in Oc-
tober 2010 indicated that sixty-eight percent of Kenyans supported ICC in-
volvement in investigating and prosecuting the post-election violence.
86
In-
deed, both defendants were some of the Kenyan Parliament’s “strongest 
supporters” in favor of the ICC handling the post-election violence cases in 
2009 when they sought to avoid efforts to establish a domestic tribunal to 
prosecute post-election violence.
87
However, once the Prosecutor announced 
charges, the popular view among Kenyans changed; fewer Kenyans contin-
ued to support ICC intervention and instead threw their support behind 
Kenyatta and Ruto.
88
This public support ultimately served as a vital tool in 
the two defendants’ defense.
B. The Kenyan Propaganda Campaign
Despite hailing from opposite sides of the political aisle and even being 
charged with committing crimes against humanity against each other’s po-
litical and ethnic groups,
89
Kenyatta and Ruto found political gold littered 
among their ICC charges. In April 2011, after returning from their first ap-
pearances before the ICC, Kenyatta and Ruto jointly conducted a prayer ral-
ly during which they attributed their charges to “politics and Western med-
dling.”
90
Shortly thereafter, despite the pending ICC charges, the two rivals 
decided to team up to create the Jubilee Coalition and run on the same ticket 
for the forthcoming 2013 presidential election.
91
Given the two men’s 
unique predicament, they chose to utilize the ICC charges as the primary 
focus of their campaign and joined forces over a common message of “ha-
85. Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Case Information Sheet (Apr. 
2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CaseInformationSheets/RutoSangEng.pdf.
86. RORISANG LEKALAKE & STEPHEN BUCHANAN-CLARKE, AFROBAROMETER,
SUPPORT FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN AFRICA 4 (2015), 
http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Policy%20papers/ab_r6_policy
paperno23_kenya_anti_corruption.pdf.
87. Samuel M. Makinda, Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta and Politicising the International 
Criminal Court, CONVERSATION (May 30, 2013, 1:12 AM), https://theconversation.com
/kenya-uhuru-kenyatta-and-politicising-the-international-criminal-court-14583. 
88. LEKALAKE & BUCHANAN-CLARKE, supra note 86, at 4 (noting support for ICC 
intervention dropped from sixty-eight percent to fifty-seven percent following the announce-
ment of the charges); see also Verini, supra note 67.
89. Geoffrey Lugano, Counter-Shaming the International Criminal Court’s Interven-
tion as Neocolonial: Lessons from Kenya, 11 INT’L J. TRANS. JUST. 9, 17 (2017).
90. Dutton, supra note 6, at 110.
91. Id.
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tred for the ICC.”
92
Specifically, the men crafted a narrative labeling the 
ICC as a “neocolonialist institution biased against Africa and improperly 
intruding on Kenyan sovereignty” and painted themselves as “victims of 
Western imperialism.”
93
They further argued that the ICC targeted them ex-
clusively for political reasons and approached the investigation with bias 
and a lack of understanding.
94
The campaign allowed for the opportunity to 
drum up support from the Kenyan populace, and had the added benefit of 
delegitimizing the charges against them—and the ICC itself—in the eyes of 
the Kenyan population.
While Kenyatta and Ruto’s claims of African bias were widely accept-
ed, especially throughout Kenya,
95
they were also filled with misrepresenta-
tions. As grounds for their arguments, Kenyatta and Ruto relied heavily on 
the fact that as of 2013, the ICC had exclusively investigated, indicted, and 
prosecuted African nationals. While this statement is accurate,
96
it fails to 
consider the context in which these investigations were opened. Most of the 
African situations before the ICC had been self-referred, and as of 2013, the 
ICC Prosecutor was also conducting preliminary investigations into situa-
tions in non-African countries, including Afghanistan, Honduras, and Ko-
rea.
97
Of the eight African situations that were before the ICC in 2013, only 
Kenya was the result of a propio motu investigation.98 Two others—Libya 
and Sudan—were referred to the ICC by the Security Council. And, as 
Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda—a Gambian national—has noted, the remaining 
five cases “were at the request of African states asking for the ICC’s inter-
vention.”
99
So, while Kenyatta and Ruto’s highly publicized claims ap-
92. Verini, supra note 67.
93. Dutton, supra note 6, at 109, 110. 
94. Dancy et al., supra note 9, at 1447.
95. LEKALAKE & BUCHANAN-CLARKE, supra note 86, at 8 (stating that, as of 2014, 
thirty-five percent of Kenyans polled by Afrobarometer believed the ICC to be biased against 
Kenyans and African states in general). 
96. See, e.g., Nanjala Nyabola, Does the ICC Have an Africa Problem?, GLOB. POL’Y
F. (Mar. 28, 2012), https://www.globalpolicy.org/international-justice/the-international-
criminal-court/general-documents-analysis-and-articles-on-the-icc/51456-does-the-icc-have-
an-africa-problem.html.
97. See Int’l Crim. Ct., Report on Preliminary Examination Activities (2013), ¶ 18 
(Nov. 25, 2013), https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/OTP%20Preliminary%20
Examinations/OTP%20-%20Report%20%20Preliminary%20Examination%20Activities%
202013.PDF.
98. Kenneth Roth, Africa Attacks the International Criminal Court, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(Jan. 14, 2014, 3:22 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/01/14/africa-attacks-international-
criminal-court.
99. Id.; Mark Caldwell, African Union Criticizes International Criminal Court at 
Member States’ Meeting, DW (Nov. 19, 2015), https://www.dw.com/en/african-union-
criticizes-international-criminal-court-at-member-states-meeting/a-18862799; see also Tim 
Cocks, ICC Says Protecting Africans, Not Targeting Them, REUTERS (June 30, 2011, 1:20 
AM), https://af.reuters.com/article/idAFJOE75T02A20110630 (quoting Prosecutor Bensou-
da’s explanation by explaining that the ICC’s focus on Africa has always been the result of the 
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peared facially accurate, many scholars and ICC experts viewed them as 
misrepresentative, or at best, overly simplistic.
100
As the Jubilee Coalition, Kenyatta and Ruto continued to utilize local 
radio shows, nationally televised talk shows, and newspaper opinion articles 
to spread their anti-ICC campaign message and accompanying disinfor-
mation.
101
They also framed the 2013 presidential campaign around the crit-
ical issue of the ICC’s presence in Kenya, essentially turning the election 
into a referendum on the ICC.
102
The men’s propaganda war proved almost 
immediately successful in drawing Kenyan support away from the ICC and 
in their favor.
103
Their labeling of the ICC as a neo-colonialist and anti-
African entity resonated with the Kenyan populace, largely because of the 
lack of public awareness and knowledge about the ICC in Africa.
104
As a re-
sult, according to reporting by the International Justice Monitor, a poll con-
ducted in June 2013 reflected Kenyan public support for the ICC at an all-
time low, with only thirty-nine percent of respondents supporting the ICC 
process.
105
Kenyatta and Ruto were eventually able to distort the charges 
against them to work in their favor, ultimately winning the Kenyan presi-
dential election,
106
with Kenyatta officially becoming the first sitting head of 
state to appear before the ICC.
107
African people’s engagement with the ICC, and that her investigations and prosecutions have 
aimed to provide justice for the victims, all of whom have been African). 
100. See, e.g., Phil Clark, Why International Justice Must Go Local: the ICC in Africa,
AFR. RSCH. INST. (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.africaresearchinstitute.org/newsite
/publications/why-international-justice-must-go-local-the-icc-in-africa/ (explaining that “criti-
cism of the [ICC] on the grounds of anti-African bias or neo-colonialism is simplistic”); Dut-
ton, supra note 6, at 117 (noting that “a great deal of evidence shows that the ICC functions 
fairly and without clear institutional bias against Africa”); Alette Smeulers, Maartje We-
erdesteijn & Barbora Hola, The Selection of Situations by the ICC: An Empirically Based 
Evaluation of the OTP’s Performance, 15 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 1, 38 (2015) (concluding 
based on empirical evidence that criticism that the ICC is biased against African countries 
“seems to be exaggerated”); see also, Nyabola, supra note 96 (noting that all of the ICC’s Af-
rican situations involve “intractable crises that the international community has struggled to 
resolve in a just and timely manner”).
101. Lugano, supra note 89, at 11.
102. Id. at 11.
103. See Dutton, supra note 6, at 109 (recognizing that as a result of the propaganda, 
“ordinary Kenyans supported those charged with crimes against humanity—instead of the 
international institution trying to bring perpetrators to justice”).
104. See id. at 109.
105. Tom Maliti, Two Opinion Polls Show Support for the ICC Drops in Kenya, INT’L
JUST. MONITOR (July 13, 2013), https://www.ijmonitor.org/2013/07/two-opinion-polls-show-
support-for-the-icc-drops-in-kenya/ (relying on a poll conducted by Ipsos Synovate and also 
noting that this reflected a drop of sixteen percentage points pertaining to support of the ICC 
from a similar poll conducted in April 2012).
106. See Did the ICC Help Uhuru Kenyatta Win Kenyan Election? BBC NEWS (Mar. 11, 
2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-21739347.
107. Dutton, Enforcing the Rome Statute, supra note 78, at 27.
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Kenyatta and Ruto’s propaganda warfare did not end with the Jubilee’s 
Coalition election victory, nor did it remain within the geographic confines 
of Kenya. After the Kenyan Parliament moved to withdraw the country 
from the Rome Statute—a result that never came to fruition
108
—Kenyatta 
and Ruto took their propaganda arguments to the African Union (“A.U.”).
109
The A.U. is a coalition of fifty-four African member nations, based loosely 
on the European Union model,
110
which aims to achieve greater unity and 
solidarity between African countries and promote peace, stability, human 
rights, and democratic values throughout Africa.
111
In October 2013, the A.U. held a special summit to discuss Africa’s re-
lationship with the ICC.
112
During the summit, Kenyatta took the floor and 
re-asserted his accusations that the ICC is anti-African and claimed that the 
ICC was engaged in “race-hunting” as a “toy of declining imperial pow-
ers.”
113
His statements helped galvanize the A.U. into taking the position 
that sitting heads of state should be immune from arrest and prosecution be-
fore the ICC and to call on the U.N. Security Council to defer proceedings 
against Kenyatta and Ruto.
114
While the ICC and the Security Council de-
clined to follow the A.U.’s recommendations, Kenyatta and Ruto’s propa-
ganda left a lasting impression in Kenya and throughout A.U. countries that 
ultimately grew into a full-scale revolution against the ICC.
C. A Lack of Cooperation
Kenyatta and Ruto supplemented their propaganda war against the ICC 
with a strategy of non-compliance and obstruction to prevent the Prosecutor 
from obtaining necessary evidence for trial. From the outset, the Prosecu-
108. L. MUTHONI WANYEKI, INST. FOR SEC. STUD., THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT’S CASES IN KENYA: ORIGIN AND IMPACT 13 (Apr. 2012), 
https://media.africaportal.org/documents/Paper237.pdf.
109. See Katrina Manson, African Union to Vote on Kenyatta Trial, FIN. TIMES (May 
25, 2013), https://www.ft.com/content/af9ac982-c556-11e2-af7a-00144feab7de (explaining 
the origins of how Kenya’s feud with the ICC became a focal point of the African Union’s  
2013 Assembly session); see also African Union Summit on ICC Pullout over Ruto Trial,
BBC NEWS (Sept. 20, 2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24173557 (quoting an 
A.U. official noting that Kenya had been “criss-crossing Africa in search of support” for their 
stance against the ICC).
110. Profile: African Union, BBC NEWS (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news
/world-africa-16910745.
111. About the African Union, AFR. UNION, https://au.int/en/overview (last visited Jan. 
5, 2021); AU in a Nutshell, AFR. UNION, https://au.int/en/au-nutshell (last visited Jan. 5, 
2021).
112. Solomon Ayele Dersso, The AU’s Extraordinary Summit Decisions on Africa-ICC 
Relationship, EJIL: TALK! (Oct. 28, 2013), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-aus-extraordinary-
summit-decisions-on-africa-icc-relationship/.
113. African Union Urges ICC to Defer Uhuru Kenyatta Case, BBC NEWS (Oct. 12, 
2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24506006.
114. See Dersso, supra note 112.
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tor’s investigation was met with repeated refusals to cooperate.
115
Despite 
multiple requests for documents, including those pertaining to security
meetings held in Kenya during the post-election violence, cell phone rec-
ords, and financial documents that could tie the defendants to allegations 
that they financed the violence, the Kenyan Government—led by Kenyatta 
and Ruto—refused to turn these over.
116
The Government’s refusal to coop-
erate with the Prosecutor’s numerous formal requests for evidence ultimate-
ly led Prosecutor Bensouda to petition the Trial Chamber to find the Gov-
ernment of Kenya non-compliant in violation of article 87 of the Rome 
Statute.
117
The Trial Chamber ultimately found Kenya’s non-compliance to 
fall “below the standard of good faith cooperation required from States Par-
ties,”
118
yet declined to refer Kenya to the Assembly of States Parties as 
permitted by the Rome Statute, deeming the Prosecution partially responsi-
ble for failing to quickly and repeatedly follow up on the Kenyan Govern-
ment’s refusal to turn over evidence.
119
In addition to this non-compliance, members of the Kenyan Govern-
ment also engaged in underhanded tactics, instituting a level of witness in-
terference that Prosecutor Bensouda described as “unprecedented.”
120
Ben-
115. See Jennifer Stanley, From Nuremberg to Kenya: Compiling the Evidence for In-
ternational Criminal Prosecutions, 49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 819, 840 (2016).
116. See, e.g., Michael Onyiego, Legal Challenges Threaten to Undermine ICC Investi-
gation in Kenya, VOA NEWS (Oct. 3, 2010), https://www.voanews.com/africa/legal-
challenges-threaten-undermine-icc-investigation-kenya (noting that the government would not 
release reports from high-level security meetings); Dutton, supra note 78, at 28 (noting that 
the government failed to turn over requested cell phone records that could have tied the de-
fendants to organizing the violence); Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11, Prosecution 
Application for a Finding of Non-compliance, ¶¶ 6–21, (Nov. 29, 2013), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2013_10100.PDF [hereinafter Prosecution Application for Non-
Compliance] (outlining the Prosecutor’s original request for financial and other records made 
in April 2012 and a litany of follow-up attempts to secure the evidence, all of which proved 
unsuccessful).
117. Prosecutor Application for Non-Compliance, supra note 116,  ¶¶ 1–2.
118. Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on Prosecution’s Application 
for Finding of Non-compliance under Article 87(7) of the Statute, ¶ 67, (Dec. 3, 2014), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2014_09899.PDF [hereinafter Trial Chamber’s De-
cision on Non-Compliance].
119. Trial Chamber’s Decision on Non-Compliance, supra note 118, at ¶¶ 85–89; see 
also Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on Prosecution’s Applications for a 
Finding of Non-compliance Pursuant to Article 87(7) and for an Adjournment of the Provi-
sional Trial Date, ¶ 52, (Mar. 31, 2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords
/CR2014_03112.PDF. The Trial Chamber originally declined to formally find Kenya in non-
compliance and simply granted a six-month adjournment in response to the Prosecution’s ini-
tial request. Trial Chamber’s Decision on Non-Compliance, supra note 118, at ¶ 15. Follow-
ing Kenya’s continued failure to cooperate, at a status conference in October 2014, Prosecutor 
Bensouda orally maintained her initial application for a finding of noncompliance, prompting 
the Trial Chamber to again address the pleading. Id.
120. Natlie Ojewska, Uhuru Kenyatta’s Trial: A Case Study in What’s Wrong with the 
ICC, GLOBALPOST (Feb. 6, 2014), https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-02-06/uhuru-kenyattas-
trial-case-study-whats-wrong-icc.
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souda’s investigation was thwarted by a widespread social media campaign 
used to identify confidential witnesses as well as “concerted and wide-
ranging efforts to harass, intimidate, and threaten” potential witnesses.
121
Following the conclusion of the case against Ruto, Bensouda reported that 
seventeen witnesses ultimately withdrew their cooperation as a result of 
threats, public shaming, and intimidation from Kenyan politicians, commu-
nity leaders, and anonymous bloggers on social media.
122
At the same time, 
the Prosecutor’s investigation was undermined by a “steady and relentless 
stream of false media reports about the Kenya cases.”
123
The Kenyan media 
would run stories supported by the defendants’ legal teams that foreign na-
tions were seeking to intervene in the case proceedings in efforts to influ-
ence Kenya’s domestic politics.
124
These unsubstantiated stories would re-
port that foreign officials, including the U.S. ambassador to Kenya, and 
Office of the Prosecutor personnel would recruit and bribe witnesses to tes-
tify against the defendants.
125
Kenyatta and Ruto’s supporters supplemented 
this more formal media coverage with social media campaigns aimed at dis-
crediting the ICC and civil society groups, “pseudo blogs,” and “paid for 
propaganda” designed to bolster support for the defendants.
126
D. Dismissal of Charges
In December 2013, after losing two key witnesses against Kenyatta—
one who was no longer willing to testify and one who confessed to giving 
false evidence—Prosecutor Bensouda requested an adjournment of the trial 
date to allow for additional investigation.
127
The Trial Chamber granted the 
121. Statement, Int’l Crim. Ct., Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court, Fatou Bensouda, on the Status of the Government of Kenya’s Cooperation with the 
Prosecution’s Investigations in the Kenyatta Case (Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int
/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-stat-04-12-2014 [hereinafter Prosecutor Statement on Status of 
Kenya’s Cooperation].
122. See Statement, Int’l Crim. Ct., Statement of the Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, Regarding Trial Chamber’s Decision to Vacate Charges 
Against Messrs William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang Without Prejudice to Their Pros-
ecution in the Future (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-stat-
160406 [hereinafter Prosecutor Statement on Ruto Decision]; Catrina Stewart, ICC on Trial 
Along with Kenya’s Elite Amid Claims of Bribery and Intimidation, GUARDIAN (Oct. 1, 2013), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/01/icc-trial-kenya-kenyatta-ruto (reporting that 
at least a dozen witnesses who were scheduled to testify had been bribed or pressured to with-
draw their testimonies).
123. Prosecutor Statement on Status of Kenya’s Cooperation, supra note 121.
124. See Sungi, supra note 62, at 154–55.
125. Id. at 155.
126. Archangel Byaruhanga Rukooko & Jon Silverman, The International Criminal 
Court and Africa: A Fractious Relationship Assessed, 19 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 85, 92 (2019).
127. Statement, Int’l Crim. Ct., Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court, Fatou Bensouda, Following an Application Seeking an Adjournment of the Provisional 
Trial Date (Dec. 19, 2013), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-statement-19-
12-2013&ln=en; see also Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Notification of 
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adjournment, and in October 2014, the Prosecutor requested a second, in-
definite adjournment due to insufficient evidence resulting from Kenya’s 
sustained lack of cooperation.
128
Despite the Prosecutor’s claims that Kenya, 
under Kenyatta’s direction, failed to comply with multiple requests for as-
sistance issued by the ICC, the Trial Chamber rejected the Prosecutor’s re-
quest for an indefinite adjournment and ordered the Prosecutor to file a no-
tice either withdrawing charges or indicating that the evidence justified 
proceeding to trial.
129
In its decision, the Trial Chamber specifically noted 
that the Prosecutor lacked any “concrete prospect of obtaining evidence suf-
ficient to meet the standard for trial and to sustain the current charges.”
130
It 
further placed the blame for the lack of evidence on the Prosecutor, reason-
ing that Prosecutor Bensouda should have made greater efforts to verify the 
credibility and reliability of her evidence and “more vigorously pursued” the 
issue of Kenya’s non-compliance at the early stages of the investigation.
131
The Prosecutor complied with the Trial Chamber’s decision by filing a 
formal notice of her withdrawal of charges against Kenyatta on December 5, 
2014,
132
which was subsequently confirmed by the Trial Chamber.
133
The 
Trial Chamber’s decision specifically noted that the charges would be dis-
missed without prejudice, permitting the Prosecutor to refile in the future, 
should she obtain sufficient evidence to support the charges.
134
In publicly 
justifying the withdrawal of charges, Prosecutor Bensouda clarified that her 
decision was based purely on lack of evidence, largely stemming from wit-
ness tampering and Kenya’s lack of cooperation.
135
Yet, there is little ques-
tion that political pressures, specifically those exerted by Kenyatta’s propa-
ganda campaign, influenced her decision. As scholar and blogger Mark 
the Removal of a Witness from the Prosecution’s Witness List and Application for an Ad-
journment of the Provisional Trial Date, ¶¶ 1–2 (Dec. 19, 2013), https://www.scribd.com
/document/192710288/Notification-of-the-removal-of-a-witness-from-the-Prosecution-s-
witness-list-and-application-for-an-adjournment-of-the-provisional-trial-date.
128. Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on Prosecution’s Ap-
plication for a Further Adjournment, ¶ 17 (Mar. 13, 2015) [hereinafter Decision on Prosecu-
tion’s Application for a Further Adjournment].
129. Id. at 26.
130. Id. ¶ 49.
131. Id. ¶¶ 51–52.
132. Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Notice of Withdrawal of the 
Charges Against Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta (Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int
/CourtRecords/CR2014_09939.PDF.
133. Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Withdrawal of 
Charges Against Mr. Kenyatta, 6 (Mar. 13, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords
/CR2015_02842.PDF.
134. Id. ¶ 9.
135. Statement, Int’l Crim. Ct., Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court, Fatou Bensouda, on the Withdrawal of Charges Against Mr. Uhur Muigai Kenyatta 
(Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-statement-05-12-2014-2.
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Kersten points out, even if Bensouda’s decision was not grounded in politi-
cal considerations, it was publicly “perceived as political.”
136
The Prosecution fared similarly in the case against Deputy President 
Ruto. Despite significant evidentiary issues, the case proceeded to trial in 
September 2013.
137
After 157 days of trial, the Prosecution closed its case in 
September 2015.
138
Subsequently, Ruto’s defense team filed for a judgment 
of acquittal,
139
and on April 5, 2016, the Trial Chamber, by a majority deci-
sion, vacated the charges against Ruto and discharged him from prosecu-
tion.
140
Notably, the decision did not serve as an acquittal, as the defense re-
quested, but simply dropped the charges without prejudice to future 
prosecution.
141
In separately authored opinions, the three majority judges 
agreed that the Prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence for a rea-
sonable Trial Chamber to determine Ruto’s guilt.
142
In his opinion, Judge 
Eboe-Osuji spoke at length regarding the role of Kenya’s propaganda war in 
the Trial Chamber’s decision.
143
He recognized the “openly aggressive cam-
paign”
144
leveled by Kenyan leaders, which included “witness interference at 
a disturbing scale,” that was:
[B]olstered and accentuated by an atmosphere of intimidation, fos-
tered by the withering hostility directed against these proceedings 
by important voices that generate pressure within Kenya at the 
community or national levels or both. Prominent among those were 
voices from the executive and legislative branches of the Govern-
136. Mark Kersten, What a Mess: ICC Prosecutor Seeks Delay in Kenyatta Trial, JUST.
CONFLICT (Dec. 19, 2013), https://justiceinconflict.org/2013/12/19/what-a-mess-icc-
prosecutor-seeks-delay-in-kenyatta-trial/ (referring to Bensouda’s initial decision to request an 
adjournment of the trial date).
137. Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Public Redacted Version of: Deci-
sion on Defence Applications for Judgments of Acquittal, ¶ 4 (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_04384.PDF [hereinafter Ruto Decision on Judgments on Ap-
plications for Judgments of Acquittal]. Ruto’s case was tried jointly with the case against 
Joshua Sang. 
138. Press Release, Int’l Crim. Ct., Ruto and Sang Case: ICC Trial Chamber V(A) Ter-





139. Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Public Redacted Version of “Corri-
gendum of Ruto Defence Request for Judgment of Acquittal” (Oct. 26, 2015), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_20293.PDF.
140. Ruto Decision on Judgments on Applications for Judgments of Acquittal, supra
note 137, at 1.
141. Id.
142. Ruto Decision on Judgments on Applications for Judgments of Acquittal, supra
note 137.
143. See id. ¶¶ 138–194.
144. Id. ¶ 146.
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ment. It was plainly wrong for them to bring such voices to bear in 
the course of an ongoing criminal trial.
145
Nevertheless, Judge Eboe-Osuji refused to allow the propaganda war to 
result in an acquittal, as Kenyatta and Ruto had requested, noting that “an 
acquittal in this case could never have resulted from political pressure.”
146
While he recognized that the leaders’ political campaign and affiliated con-
duct towards witnesses directly impeded the Prosecutor’s ability to present 
her case, he made clear that “extra-judicial conducts, campaigns or demands 
could not influence the Chamber to acquit or convict the accused” and that 
nothing other than the evidence itself would influence the Chamber’s deci-
sion.
147
Instead, Judge Eboe-Osuji specifically noted that the Prosecution re-
tains the right to re-prosecute the case and reiterated that “political interven-
tion does not work.”
148
Following the Trial Court’s decision, Prosecutor 
Bensouda issued a statement in which she attributed the case’s demise to 
erosion by a “‘perfect storm’ of witness interference and intense politiciza-
tion of the Court’s legal mandate and work.”
149
Of the Trial Chamber’s deci-
sion to vacate charges against Ruto but not acquit him, Prosecutor Bensouda 
said it sent the “strong message” that “witness interference and perverting 
the cause of justice will not be tolerated at the ICC.”
150
E.  Impact
Through tactile political maneuverings, Kenyatta and Ruto were able to 
label the ICC as a tool of the imperial west intervening in the affairs of Af-
rican nations.
151
Despite Prosecutor Bensouda’s optimistic takeaway from 
the Trial Chamber decision and Judge Eboe-Osuji’s firm stance that the ICC 
would not be swayed by political influence or propaganda, there is little 
question that the Kenyan propaganda campaign successfully prompted the 
Trial Chamber’s dismissal of charges against both Kenyatta and Ruto. By 
swaying public opinion within Kenya and throughout the African Union, 
Kenyatta and Ruto were able to justify a sustained campaign of non-
cooperation and non-compliance that ultimately led to their victory over the 
ICC charges.
The immediate impact of the failed Kenya cases was devastating. Two 
high-profile defendants, along with four other defendants charged within the 
Situation in Kenya, for whom there existed a strong prima facie case of 
145. Id. ¶¶ 140–142.
146. Id. ¶ 149.
147. Id. ¶¶ 141–142, 145.
148. Id. ¶¶ 149, 464.
149. Prosecutor Statement on Ruto Decision, supra note 122.
150. Id.
151. See Michela Wrong, Argument: Has Kenya Destroyed the ICC?, FOREIGN POL’Y
(July 15, 2014), https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/15/has-kenya-destroyed-the-icc/#.
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crimes against humanity,
152
were able to defeat charges and escape without 
serious consequence. In fact, Kenyatta and Ruto ultimately benefited from 
the charges, as political science experts credited their propaganda campaign 
against the ICC as a primary reason for their success in the 2013 election.
153
At the time of publication, Kenyatta and Ruto continue to serve in their re-
spective roles as President and Deputy President of Kenya,
154
and to date, 
the Prosecutor has not refiled charges against either defendant.
155
The Prose-
cutor’s failure to prevail on charges against either defendant significantly 
undermined the credibility and competency of not just the Office of the 
Prosecutor, but the ICC more generally.
156
Moreover, the defendants’ long-
running propaganda war succeeded in painting a lasting and vivid portrayal 
of the ICC as a biased and racist institution.
Since there was a possibility that the Prosecutor could refile charges 
against both men, Kenyatta and Ruto continued their propaganda war 
against the ICC even after charges were dismissed.
157
In early 2016, Kenyat-
ta, who by then had earned the media’s title as the ICC’s “chief tormen-
tor,”
158
made a speech to the A.U. in which he called for a “roadmap for 
withdrawal” for African States Parties from the Rome Statute.
159
Amidst 
152. See Alastair Leithead, Dismissal of Case Against Kenya’s Ruto Huge Blow to ICC,
BBC NEWS (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35974172.
153. See Courtney Hillebrecht, International Criminal Accountability and the Domestic 
Politics of Resistance: Case Studies from Kenya and Lebanon, 54 L. & SOC’Y REV. 453, 477–
78 (2020) (arguing that Kenyatta and Ruto’s handling of the ICC charges contributed to their 
electoral victory).
154. Executive Office of the President, PRESIDENT KENYA, https://www.president.go.ke
/presidency/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2021); Office of the Deputy President, PRESIDENT KENYA, 
https://www.president.go.ke/office-of-the-deputy-president/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2021).
155. However, the Kenya Situation remains open before the ICC. Situations Under In-
vestigation, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/situation.aspx (last visited Sept. 
17, 2020). 
156. Simon Allison, Think Again: How to Beat the ICC – Lessons from the Kenyatta 
Case, INST. FOR SEC. STUD., https://issafrica.org/amp/iss-today/think-again-how-to-beat-the-
icc-lessons-from-the-kenyatta-case (last visited Sept. 17, 2020); see also Hillebrecht, supra
note 153, at 477.
157. For instance, in October 2014, in a speech to the UN General Assembly, Kenya’s
ambassador to the UN reiterated the neo-colonialist narrative by arguing that the ICC is being 
manipulated by “a pernicious group of countries,” who possess great power “mostly born of 
an imperialist and colonial adventure.” Dutton, Enforcing the Rome Statute, supra note 78, at 
25; Kenya’s United Nations Envoy Launches Stinging Attack on ICC, CITIZEN (Nov. 2, 2014), 
https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/news/africa/Kenya-s-United-Nations-envoy-launches-stinging-
attack-on-ICC/3302426-2507942-7891xoz/index.html. Likewise, around the same time, Ken-
yatta publicly vowed never to never again cooperate with the ICC. Lugano, supra note 89, at 
21. 
158. Ed Cropley, ICC’s Toughest Trial: Africa vs. ‘Infamous Caucasian Court’,
REUTERS (Oct. 28, 2016), https://br.reuters.com/article/us-africa-icc/iccs-toughest-trial-africa-
vs-infamous-caucasian-court-idUSKCN12S1U3.
159. Id.; Batram S. Brown, The International Criminal Court in Africa: Impartiality, 
Politics, Complementarity and Brexit, 31 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 145, 166 (2017). 
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other controversies, such as the ICC’s indictment of then-Sudanese Presi-
dent Omar al-Bashir,
160
the A.U. adopted Kenyatta’s proposal, and in 2017, 
issued a non-binding resolution encouraging a withdrawal of African States 
Parties from the Rome Statute.
161
Although the proposed mass withdrawal 
never materialized, it did prompt South Africa—albeit temporarily
162
—and 
Burundi to formally withdraw from the Rome Statute.
163
Moreover this 
large-scale threat of withdrawal presented such a critical legitimacy disaster
for the ICC that scholars began considering the “serious risk” that the ICC 
could “fall apart entirely.”
164
The ICC has not fallen apart, but it does still live in the shadow of Ken-
ya’s propaganda wars. While the ICC achieved significant achievements in 
convicting several other defendants between 2016 and 2019, Prosecutor 
Bensouda herself admits that these were overshadowed by the failures in 
and aftermath of the Kenya cases.
165
Moreover, the ICC still remains “a tox-
ic brand in much of Africa,”
166
and allegations of anti-African bias continue 
to plague the ICC.
167
160. Priya Pillai, The African Union, the International Criminal Court, and the Interna-
tional Court of Justice: At the Fault Lines of International Accountability, AM. SOC’Y INT’L 
L.: INSIGHTS (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/22/issue/10/african-
union-international-criminal-court-and-international-court (explaining the fraught A.U.-ICC 
relationship is due in part to the ICC’s indictment of Al-Bashir and its repeated calls for his 
arrest).
161. Draft Withdrawal Strategy Document Afr. Union Ver. 12.01.2017 (Dec. 1, 2017), 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources
/icc_withdrawal_strategy_jan._2017.pdf; see also S.J. Tilden, Africa’s Conflict with the Inter-
national Criminal Court: The African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights as an 
Alternative to the ICC, 27 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 201, 201 (2018). 
162. While South Africa initiated withdrawal proceedings, it ultimately revoked its deci-
sion to withdraw following a decision by a South African High Court that deemed the with-
drawal “unconstitutional and invalid.” Hannah Woolaver, Domestic and International Limita-
tions on Treaty Withdrawal: Lessons from South Africa’s Attempted Departure from the 
International Criminal Court, 111 AM. J. INT’L L.: UNBOUND 450, 450–51 (2018).
163. Burundi formally withdrew from the Rome Statute on October 27, 2017. Burundi,
INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/burundi (last visited Sept. 17, 2020). The Gambia 
also indicated that it would withdraw, but it “reverse[d] course almost immediately after a 
newly elected government assumed power.” Franck Kuwonu, ICC: Beyond the Threats of 
Withdrawal, UN AFR. RENEWAL (May–July 2017), https://www.un.org/africarenewal
/magazine/may-july-2017/icc-beyond-threats-withdrawal.
164. Galand, supra note 10, at 934.
165. INT’L CRIM. CT. OFF. OF THE PROSECUTOR, STRATEGIC PLAN 2019–2020, at 11
(July 17, 2019), https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/20190726-strategic-plan-eng.pdf
[hereinafter [hereinafter ICC PROSECUTOR 2019-2021 STRATEGIC PLAN].
166. Michela Wrong, supra note 151 (quoting John Ryle of the Rift Valley Institute 
think tank).
167. See Kamari Maxine Clarke, Negotiating Racial Injustice: How International Crim-
inal Law Helps Entrench Structural Inequality, JUST SEC. (Jul. 24, 2020), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/71614/negotiating-racial-injustice-how-international-criminal-
law-helps-entrench-structural-inequality/ (alleging that the ICC’s “particular notion of justice 
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Possibly the most devastating legacy of the Kenya cases is that they 
paved the way for future propaganda wars against the ICC. Kenyatta and 
Ruto’s propaganda war and corresponding non-compliance created a
roadmap for states to use against future contested ICC charges.
168
Kenyatta 
and Ruto showed the world that the way to defeat the ICC was through a 
combination of militarizing public opinion and obstructionism. A few years 
after the charges against Kenyatta and Ruto were dismissed, the United 
States leaders used this exact roadmap in efforts to avoid similar charges.
IV. The United States & The Investigation Into Afghanistan
Since its creation, one of the ICC’s greatest weaknesses has been the 
lack of support from the world’s biggest superpower, the United States. Un-
like Kenya, the United States is not and never has been a State Party to the 
ICC. The ICC has long endured a turbulent relationship with the United 
States, which has varied based on the presidential administration in pow-
er.
169
However, even under George W. Bush, a president whose administra-
tion was stridently against the ICC’s mission,
170
the United States never ac-
tively undermined ongoing ICC operations. This state of affairs changed 
drastically under Former President Trump with Prosecutor Bensouda’s pro-
pio motu investigation into Afghanistan.
A. Request for Investigation & Subsequent Backlash
Since the 1970s, Afghanistan has endured a prolonged period of un-
rest.
171
The country was torn apart by a series of civil wars, which ultimately 
invited international participation and culminated in the U.S. invasion of 
has caused it to reproduce deep, global structural inequalities” and specifically noting that of 
the forty-two indictments issued by the ICC, all were for black or Arab-Africans).
168. Allison, supra note 156 (“Thanks to Kenyatta, there is now a proven template for 
evading international justice.”).
169. See generally Leila Nadya Sadat & Mark A. Drumbl, The United States and the 
International Criminal Court: A Complicated, Uneasy, Yet at Times Engaging Relationship,
2–8 (Wash. U. St. Louis Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper Series, 2016), 
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1504&context=wlufac 
(tracing the history of U.S. involvement in and relationship with the ICC under the Clinton, 
Bush, and Obama administrations). 
170. See Milena Sterio, The International Criminal Court: Current Challenges and Pro-
spect of Future Success, 52 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 467, 473–74 (2020) (stating that “the 
ICC had a difficult relationship with the United States during the George W. Bush administra-
tion).
171. See Abdul Mahir Hazim, Toward Cooperation Between Afghanistan and the Inter-
national Criminal Court, 49 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 615, 617 (2017) (noting that between 
1978 and 2003, all parties to conflicts in Afghanistan have committed war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and human rights violations).
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Afghanistan following the September 11 terrorist attacks.
172
During this in-
vasion, named “Operation Enduring Freedom,” American troops sought to
defeat Al Qaeda and the Taliban-run Government.
173
As part of the mission, 
U.S. troops armed and trained Afghan anti-Taliban groups, which ultimately 
succeeded in ousting the Taliban from power.
174
Following the fall of the 
Taliban, the security situation within the country remained dire, with dan-
gerous levels of insurgency and the increased prevalence of terrorist groups 
such as the Haqqani Network and ISIS.
175
During Operation Enduring Freedom, the U.S. military detained sus-
pected Al-Qaeda and Taliban members both within Afghanistan and at Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency (“CIA”)-operated “black site” prisons in other na-
tions.
176
As confirmed through Congressional reports, the CIA engaged in 
government-approved torture of these detainees.
177
The CIA “torture pro-
gram” provided for the use of “enhanced interrogation techniques”
178
against 
captured suspected Taliban members by controversially labeling them as 
“enemy combatants,” rather than prisoners of war, thereby depriving them 
of many of the significant protections afforded by the Geneva Conven-
tions.
179
In 2006, under Prosecutor Moreno Ocampo, the ICC Office of the Pros-
ecutor opened a propio motu preliminary examination into alleged atrocity 
172. See Afghanistan, COAL. FOR INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org
/country/afghanistan (last visited Sept. 7, 2020).  
173. Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Case No. ICC_02/17, Public Re-
dacted Version of “Request for Authorisation of an Investigation Pursuant to Article 15”, 20 
November 2017, ICC_02/17-7-Conf-Exp, ¶ 15, https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords
/CR2017_06891.PDF [hereinafter Request for Authorisation of Investigation].
174. Id.
175. Request for Authorisation of Investigation, supra note 173, ¶¶ 18–19.
176. See Margaret L. Satterthwaite, De-Torturing the Logic: The Contribution of CAT 
General Comment 2 to the Debate over Extraordinary Extradition, 11 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 281,  
281–82 (2008) (estimating that at least three dozen individuals have been held in secret pris-
ons known as CIA “black sites”); see also Request for Authorisation of Investigation, supra
note 173, ¶ 189 (alleging that U.S. armed forces committed crimes against at least twenty-four 
detainees both in Afghanistan and in other States Parties, “namely Poland, Romania and Lith-
uania” between 2003 and 2004).
177. See generally Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Committee 
Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program (Dec. 9, 
2014), https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/publications/CRPT-113srpt
288.pdf; see also Request for Authorisation of Investigation, supra note 173, ¶ 193 (listing the 
specific alleged acts used by CIA officials against detainees).
178. Enhanced Interrogation Explained, HUM. RTS. FIRST (Feb. 2016), 
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/Enhanced-Interrogation-Fact-Sheet.pdf 
(detailing the practices that constituted “enhanced interrogation techniques” and their unlaw-
fulness under international law).
179. Peter Jan Honigsberg, Chasing “Enemy Combatants”and Circumventing Interna-
tional Law: A License for Sanctioned Abuse, 12 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1, 5 
(2007). 
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crimes committed in Afghanistan.
180
Minimal progress was made in the in-
vestigation until over a decade later, largely because of security concerns 
and the Prosecutor’s inability to secure cooperation from stakeholders in the 
investigation.
181
However, in November 2017, as required to move forward 
with a propio motu investigation pursuant to article 15,182 Prosecutor Fatou 
Bensouda filed a formal request with Pre Trial Chamber III to open an in-
vestigation into alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed 
in Afghanistan since May 1, 2003, as well as closely linked crimes commit-
ted in other States Parties’ territories since July 1, 2002.
183
The scope of this 
proposed investigation encompassed three general categories of alleged 
crimes:
(1) Crimes against humanity and war crimes by the Taliban and 
their affiliated Haqqani Network;
(2) War crimes by the Afghan National Security Forces … [;] and
(3) War crimes by members of U.S. armed forces on the territory 
of Afghanistan, and by members of the U.S. CIA in secret de-
tention facilities in Afghanistan and on the territory of other 
States Parties to the Rome Statute, principally in the period of 
2003-2004.
184
With regard to the third category of crimes encompassed in the pro-
posed investigation, in her request, Bensouda acknowledged that the evi-
dence acquired in her preliminary examination provided a reasonable basis 
to find that U.S. armed forces engaged in war crimes of torture and cruel 
treatment, outrages upon personal dignity, and rape and other forms of sex-
ual violence.
185
In response to Prosecutor Bensouda’s request, the United 
States went on the offensive, launching a disinformation and anti-ICC prop-
aganda campaign before the media. This charge was largely led by National 
Security Advisor John Bolton, until he was fired from the Trump Admin-
istration in 2019.
186
Bolton is arguably the politician who boasts the most 
strident anti-ICC history. As the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations 
under President George W. Bush, Bolton famously cited his “happiest mo-
180. Request for Authorisation of Investigation, supra note 173, ¶ 22.
181. Request for Authorisation of Investigation, supra note 173, ¶ 24.
182. Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 15.
183. Request for Authorisation of Investigation, supra note 173, ¶ 187.
184. Statement, Int’l Crim. Ct., The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, 
Fatou Bensouda, Requests Judicial Authorization to Commence an Investigation into the Situ-
ation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages
/item.aspx?name=171120-otp-stat-afgh.
185. Request for Authorisation of Investigation, supra note 173, ¶ 187.
186. Peter Baker, Trump Ousts John Bolton as National Security Advisor, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/10/us/politics/john-bolton-national-
security-adviser-trump.html.
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ment” as notifying the U.N. that the U.S. had symbolically “unsigned the 
Rome Statute.”
187
On September 10, 2018, John Bolton used a speech to the Federalist 
Society in Washington, D.C. to make a “major announcement” on U.S. pol-
icy towards the ICC.
188
Bolton opened his address by chiding the ICC for 
being “ineffective, unaccountable, and indeed outright dangerous,” and not-
ing that while its theoretical aim is to hold atrocity perpetrators accountable, 
in actuality, its central aim is to “constrain the United States.”
189
He then 
stated that the U.S. would “let the ICC die on its own,” since “for all intents 
and purposes, the ICC is already dead to us.”
190
Bolton closed his speech 
with a “pledge to the American people,” that he would take specific actions 
to respond to any future attempts to investigate the U.S., Israel, or its allies, 
in which he threatened ICC personnel with sanctions and potential criminal 
prosecution and warned any nations that chose to cooperate with the ICC 
that their cooperation would detrimentally affect future U.S. foreign or mili-
tary assistance.
191
Bolton’s hyperbolic speech sent a clear message. Not only was this in-
tended to bully the ICC and its Prosecutor into keeping their hands off 
American sovereignty and American nationals, but this speech, given at a 
high-profile event with press present, was meant to convey a louder global 
message that America is more powerful than any international court. As 
John Bellinger noted, rather than engaging the ICC in “quiet diplomacy,” 
the Trump Administration chose to “[throw] down the gauntlet in public.”
192
And not only was Bolton’s speech hawkish and hyperbolic, but it also 
served as a means of spreading disinformation. Most importantly, Bolton 
repeatedly exaggerated the scope of ICC jurisdiction, boldly asserting with-
out justification that the ICC seeks to apply universal jurisdiction and that it
would try to prosecute U.S. officials for the crime of aggression, which are, 
in actuality, procedural impossibilities under the text of the Rome Statute.
193
187. John B. Bellinger III, International Law and the Foreign Affairs Challenges for the 
Next Administration, 48 GEO. J. INT’L L. 909, 913 (2017); Letter from John R. Bolton, Under 
Sec’y of State for Arms Control and Int’l Sec., to Kofi Annan, U.N. Sec’y Gen. (May 6, 
2002), https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm.
188. Full Text of John Bolton’s Speech to the Federalist Society, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 10, 
2018), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/09/full-text-john-bolton-speech-federalist-




192. John Bellinger, The Trump Administration Throws Down the Gauntlet to the ICC. 
The Court Should Decline the Challenge, LAWFARE (Sept. 10, 2018, 11:50 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/trump-administration-throws-down-gauntlet-icc-court-should-
decline-challenge; Jean Galbraith, Trump Administration Expresses Strong Disapproval of the 
International Criminal Court, 113 AM. J. INT’L L. 169, 172 (2019).
193. Alex Whiting, Why John Bolton vs. Int’l Criminal Court 2.0 is Different from Ver-
sion 1.0, JUST SEC. (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/60680/international-
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Some commentators questioned the validity of Bolton’s threats, with many 
doubting the existence of any federal U.S. law that would allow for criminal 
prosecution of court officials.
194
This speech was the first step in a prolonged anti-ICC publicity and dis-
information campaign initiated by the Trump Administration. In his speech 
to the U.N. General Assembly in late September 2018, President Trump re-
ferred to the ICC as “having no jurisdiction, no legitimacy, and no authori-
ty” in the eyes of the United States, and echoed Bolton’s falsehoods that the 
ICC “claims near-universal jurisdiction over the citizens of every country, 
violating all principles of justice, fairness, and due process.”
195
Then, on 
April 5, 2019, following Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s announcement 
that he would impose visa restrictions on ICC personnel intending to travel 
to the U.S. for the investigation,
196
the United States revoked the entry visa 
for Prosecutor Bensouda and threatened to take additional steps, including 
imposing economic sanctions, if the ICC continued its investigation.
197
B. Pre-Trial Chamber Decision & Global Response
The Pre-Trial Chamber’s approval of Prosecutor Bensouda’s request for 
an investigation was widely anticipated, and as one scholar noted, “a near 
certainty.”
198
Yet, in what many found to be a surprise decision,
199
on April 
12, 2019, the three-judge Pre-Trial Chamber III issued a unanimous opinion 
rejecting Prosecutor Bensouda’s request to proceed with the investigation.
200
Under Rome Statute article 15, if the ICC Prosecutor concludes that there is 
criminal-court-john-bolton-afghanistan-torture/; David Bosco, Bolton Barked at the ICC, But 
With How Much Bite?, LAWFARE (Sept. 11, 2018, 2:01 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com
/bolton-barked-icc-how-much-bite.
194. Bellinger, supra note 192 (noting that he is “not aware of any federal criminal stat-
ute that could be used to charge ICC judges or prosecutors”).
195. Donald Trump, U.S. President, Remarks by President Trump to the 73
rd
Session of 
the United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 25, 2018), https://usoas.usmission.gov/remarks-
by-president-trump-to-the-73rd-session-of-the-united-nations-general-assembly-new-york-
ny/.
196. Lesley Wroughton, U.S. Imposes Visa Bans on International Criminal Court Inves-
tigators - Pompeo, REUTERS (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-icc/u-s-
imposes-bans-on-international-criminal-court-investigators-pompeo-idUSKCN1QW1ZH.
197. Marlise Simons & Megan Specia, U.S. Revokes Visa of I.C.C. Prosecutor Pursuing 
Afghan War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/05/world
/europe/us-icc-prosecutor-afghanistan.html.
198. Bosco, supra note 193.
199. Patryk I. Labuda, A Neo-Colonial Court for Weak States? Not Quite. Making Sense 
of the International Criminal Court’s Afghanistan Decision, EJIL: TALK! (Apr. 13, 2019), 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/a-neo-colonial-court-for-weak-states-not-quite-making-sense-of-the-
international-criminal-courts-afghanistan-decision/.
200. Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Case No. ICC-02/17, Decision 
Pursuant to Art. 15 of the Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in 
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan ¶ 94 (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.icc-cpi.int
/CourtRecords/CR2019_02068.PDF [hereinafter Pre-Trial Decision on Authorisation].
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a “reasonable basis” to proceed with an investigation proprio motu, she 
must request authorization from the Pre-Trial Chamber.
201
As the Pre-Trial 
Chamber itself recognized, “reasonable basis” is the lowest evidentiary 
standard in the ICC’s statutory framework.
202
Article 53 provides the Prose-
cutor with additional insight into determining whether a “reasonable basis” 
exists to open an investigation and outlines the following considerations:
(a) The information available to the Prosecutor provides a reason-
able basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court has been or is being committed;
(b) The case is or would be admissible under article 17; and
(c) Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of 
victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that 
an investigation would not serve the interests of justice.
203
Article 15 further provides:
If the Pre-Trial Chamber, upon examination of the request and 
the supporting material, considers that there is a reasonable basis to 
proceed with an investigation, and that the case appears to fall with-
in the jurisdiction of the Court, it shall authorize the commence-
ment of the investigation[.]
204
In its decision, the Pre-Trial Chamber recognized its “duty and respon-
sibility to conduct a scrutiny on all of the evaluations that have led the Pros-
ecutor to apply for an authorisation to investigate, including those pertinent 
to the prospects of an investigation.”
205
It then proceeded to review the Pros-
ecutor’s evaluations of the three considerations in article 53: jurisdiction, 
admissibility, and whether an investigation would not serve “the interests of 
justice.”
206
The Pre-Trial Chamber agreed that Prosecutor Bensouda’s pro-
posed investigation met the jurisdictional and admissibility requirements of 
the Rome Statute but ultimately determined that it would not further the in-
terests of justice.
207
The Pre-Trial Chamber largely rested this determination 
on its finding that the investigation had already met “severe constraints and 
challenges” and that the “complexity and volatility of the political climate 
still surrounding the Afghan scenario” made prospects of securing future 
“meaningful cooperation from relevant authorities” unlikely.
208
201. Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 15(3).
202. Pre-Trial Decision on Authorization, supra note 200, ¶ 31.
203. Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 53(1).
204. Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 15(4).
205. Pre-Trial Decision on Authorization, supra note 200, ¶ 44.
206. Id. ¶¶ 45–96
207. Id. ¶ 87.
208. Id. ¶¶ 44, 94. The Pre-Trial Chamber also recognized that interests of justice would 
be undermined by the long delay between the crimes, which largely occurred between 2005 
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While the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision was warmly received by the 
Trump Administration,
209
it sparked new backlash from scholars, practition-
ers, and governments of States Parties.
210
It portrayed the ICC as a weak in-
stitution willing to bend to political pressures exerted by superpowers. It al-
so rewarded obstructionism and welcomed new attacks on the court, 
recognizing that if states refused to cooperate with investigations, there 
would be a greater likelihood that such investigations would fail to move 
forward.
211
In authoring an opinion viewed as controversial only among ICC 
supporters, the Pre-Trial Chamber embroiled the ICC in a greater political 
battle, essentially providing the ICC the ability to avoid being forced to rule 
on controversial and highly political issues stemming from U.S. liability for 
atrocity crimes. Scholar Jed Odermatt has recognized the proclivity of inter-
national courts that are predisposed to politics, such as the International 
Court of Justice, and the Court of Justice of the European Union, to dispose 
of or decline to hear cases that would put the court in a sensitive position to 
resolve a controversial political issue.
212
The ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber’s de-
cision to reject Prosecutor Bensouda’s request for an investigation on pro-
cedural grounds, and specifically on the relatively low-profile “interests of 
and 2015 and the investigation, as well as the significant amounts of resources the investiga-
tion would require. Id. ¶¶ 93, 95.
209. Carol Morello, Trump Administration Applauds International Court’s Decision to 
Abandon Afghan War Crimes Probe, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-administration-applauds-
international-courts-decision-to-abandon-afghan-war-crimes-probe/2019/04/12/610fd2b6-
5d4a-11e9-a00e-050dc7b82693_story.html (referencing a Presidential statement labeling the 
decision “a major international victory, not only for [American] patriots, but for the rule of 
law”).
210. See, e.g., Afghanistan: ICC Refuses to Authorize Investigation, Caving into USA 
Threats, AMNESTY INT’L (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/04
/afghanistan-icc-refuses-to-authorize-investigation-caving-into-usa-threats/ (opining that the 
decision “marks a shocking abandonment of victims and will further weaken the court’s cred-
ibility”); Christian De Vos, No ICC Investigation in Afghanistan: A Bad Decision with Big 
Implications, INT’L JUST. MONITOR (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.ijmonitor.org/2019/04/no-
icc-investigation-in-afghanistan-a-bad-decision-with-big-implications/ (noting that the deci-
sion “surprised and angered many”); Kevin Jon Heller, One Word for the PTC on the Interests 
of Justice: Taliban, OPINIOJURIS (Apr. 13, 2019) (recognizing that the Pre-Trial Chamber’s
decision not only blocked an investigation into the United States, but also precluded investiga-
tions and prosecutions of Taliban officials responsible for heinous crimes, leaving their vic-
tims without justice); ICC: Judges Reject Afghanistan Investigation, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 
12, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/04/12/icc-judges-reject-afghanistan-investigation. 
211. See ICC: Judges Reject Afghanistan Investigation, supra note 210; David Luban, 
The “Interests of Justice” at the ICC: A Continuing Mystery, JUST SEC. (Mar. 17, 2020) 
https://www.justsecurity.org/69188/the-interests-of-justice-at-the-icc-a-continuing-mystery/
(arguing that “it seems perverse to reward obstruction, and even more perverse to relabel de-
feat as ‘serving’ the interests of justice”). 
212. Jed Odermatt, Patterns of Avoidance: Political Questions Before International 
Courts, 14 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT, 221, 227 (2018) (also recognizing that another strategy used 
by international courts is to “decide a case, but to do so in a manner that avoids the most polit-
ically sensitive parts of the case”). 
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justice” language, which many ICC experts believed plays little role in de-
termining whether to open investigations,
213
exemplifies the political avoid-
ance that Odermatt so deftly attributes to other international courts.
And while the Pre-Trial Chamber’s opinion is notably absent of lan-
guage referring to the United States’ propaganda campaign against the ICC, 
the circumstances surrounding the decision strongly imply that the Pre-Trial 
Chamber’s rejection was the product of U.S. pressures. For example, the 
decision took seventeen months for the Pre-Trial Chamber to issue, which, 
as critics have noted, was extensive for a relatively short and straightfor-
ward analysis.
214
The decision was also issued on April 12, 2019, exactly a 
week after Pompeo revoked the prosecutorial team’s travel visas.
215
Even 
more clearly, the Pre-Trial Chamber departed from its traditional approach 
of removing all political considerations from its opinion,
216
choosing instead 
to openly acknowledge the “complexity and volatility of the political cli-
mate” surrounding the crimes under investigation.
217
C. Trial Chamber Decision & Resulting Sanctions
In the midst of the backlash to the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision, Prose-
cutor Bensouda and the legal representatives of eighty-two victims separate-
ly appealed the rejection of her request for authorization.
218
On March 2020, 
the Trial Chamber issued its judgment amending the Pre-Trial Chamber’s 
decision and authorizing Bensouda to:
[C]ommence an investigation ‘in relation to alleged crimes 
committed on the territory of Afghanistan in the period since 1 May 
2003, as well as other alleged crimes that have a nexus to the armed 
conflict in Afghanistan and are sufficiently linked to the situation 
and were committed on the territory of other States Parties in the 
period since 1 July 2002’.
219
213. E.g. Labuda, supra note 199.
214. ICC Pre-Trial Chamber Rejects OTP Request to Open an Investigation in Afghani-




216. ICC: Judges Reject Afghanistan Investigation, supra note 210 (noting the Pre-Trial 
Chamber’s “decision to take political factors into consideration in its decision was unusual”).
217. Pre-Trial Decision on Authorization, supra note 200, ¶ 94.
218. Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, No. ICC-02/17, Request for 
Leave to Appeal the “Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisa-
tion of an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan” (June 7, 
2019), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2019_03060.PDF; Situation in the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan, No. ICC-02/17 OA, Victims’ Appeal Brief (June 24, 2019), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2019_03328.PDF.
219. Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, No. ICC-02/17 OA4, Judgment 
on the appeal against the decision on the authorization of an investigation into the situation in 
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The Appeals Chamber determined that the Pre-Trial Chamber erred in 
its interpretation of Rules 15 and 53.
220
The Appeals Chamber specifically 
found that while the Prosecutor must consider the article 53 considerations 
in determining whether to request to open an investigation, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber is only required to determine whether there is “a reasonable factu-
al basis to proceed with an investigation, in the sense of whether crimes 
have been committed and whether potential case(s) arising from such inves-
tigation appear to fall within the Court’s jurisdiction.”
221
The Pre-Trial 
Chamber was not intended to second guess the Prosecutor’s analysis of the 
article 53 considerations, and specifically should not even have analyzed 
whether the proposed investigation furthered the “interests of justice.”
222
While ICC supporters welcomed the Trial Chamber’s decision,
223
the 
U.S. Government leveled a second wave of propaganda warfare against the 
ICC. In a White House press conference on the day of the judgment, Secre-
tary Pompeo discredited the ICC as an “unaccountable political institution 
masquerading as a legal body.”
224
Shortly thereafter, during a State Depart-
ment press briefing, Secretary Pompeo singled out individual ICC personnel 
and their family members, noting that the U.S. Government would consider 
steps to take against them for “putting Americans at risk.”
225
These vague, 
highly publicized threats continued for months
226
until the anticipated pun-
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, pmbl. (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.icc-cpi.int
/CourtRecords/CR2020_00828.PDF [hereinafter Afghanistan Judgment on Appeal].
220. Afghanistan Judgment on Appeal, supra note 219, ¶ 23.
221. Afghanistan Judgment on Appeal, supra note 219, ¶ 34.
222. Afghanistan Judgment on Appeal, supra note 219, ¶ 37.
223. See e.g., ICC Greenlights Afghanistan Investigation, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 5, 
2020), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/05/icc-greenlights-afghanistan-investigation (stat-
ing that the decision “gives atrocity victims hope for future justice); Afghanistan: ICC Author-
izes Historic Investigation, AMNESTY INT’L (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.amnesty.org/en
/latest/news/2020/03/afghanistan-icc-authorizes-historic-investigation/ (noting that through 
this decision, the ICC “reversed a terrible mistake and decided to stand by the victims of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity”); CICC Members: Welcome Afghanistan Decision High-




202020%2C%20the,crimes%20against%20humanity%20in%20Afghanistan (listing Coalition 
for the International Criminal Court representatives’ comments applauding the Trial Cham-
ber’s decision).
224. ICC Decision on Afghanistan, U.S. DEPT. STATE (Mar. 5, 2020), https://2017-
2021.state.gov/icc-decision-on-afghanistan/index.html.
225. Secretary Pompeo’s Remarks to the Press, U.S. DEPT. STATE (Mar. 17, 2020), 
https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-remarks-to-the-press-6/index.html 
(naming ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, Bensouda’s Chef de Cabinet Sam Shomanesh, and 
Phakiso Mochochoko as individuals driving the investigation into American nationals).
226. E.g. Quint Forgey, Pompeo Signals Impending Action Against ICC for Investigat-
ing Alleged U.S. War Crimes, POLITICO (June 1, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020
/06/01/mike-pompeo-icc-investigating-us-war-crimes-293673 (explaining how in early June, 
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ishment came in the form of an Executive Order signed by President Trump 
on June 11, 2020.
227
The Executive Order opened by explaining the danger the ICC’s Af-
ghanistan investigation posed to the United States, noting that the Prosecu-
tor’s actions “threaten to infringe upon the sovereignty of the United States 
and impede the critical national security and foreign policy work of United 
States Government and allied officials, and thereby threaten the national se-
curity and foreign policy work of the United States.”
228
The order concluded 
that this potential threat was sufficient to declare a “national emergency” 
that warranted the imposition of sanctions.
229
While the order did not actual-
ly level sanctions against specific individuals, it laid the legal groundwork 
for imposing future sanctions against any foreign person determined by the 
Secretary of State to have directly engaged or materially assisted in the 
ICC’s investigation, arrest, detention, or prosecution of nationals of the U.S. 
or its allies.
230
These sanctions allowed  the U.S. Government to freeze or 
“block” any of the sanctioned person’s property or interests that are located 
in the United States or which “come within the possession or control of any 
United States person.”
231
While it was unclear for several months whether 
the United States would act on the Executive Order by issuing sanctions or 
allow it to hang over the ICC as a threat, on September 2, 2020, Secretary 
Pompeo formally announced the issuance of sanctions pursuant to the Exec-
utive Order against Prosecutor Bensouda and Phakiso Mocochoko, the 
ICC’s Head of Jurisdiction, Complementarity and Cooperation Division.
232
D. Impact
Unlike with the propaganda war initiated by Kenya, the ICC is only just 
beginning to feel the impact of the U.S. attack. The authorization and sub-
sequent imposition of sanctions elicited strong criticism of U.S. conduct and 
an outpouring of support for the ICC from scholars, civil society, and gov-
ernmental officials.
233
Notably, in a joint statement, sixty-seven States Par-
Pompeo teased forthcoming governmental action to “push back” against the ICC in an inter-
view on the conservative “What the Hell is Going On” podcast).
227. Executive Order 13928, 85 Fed. Reg. 36,139 (June 11, 2020).
228. Id. at 36,139.
229. Id. at 36,139.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 36,139.
232. Actions to Protect U.S. Personnel from Illegitimate Investigation by the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, U.S. DEPT. STATE (Sept. 2, 2020), https://2017-2021.state.gov/actions-
to-protect-u-s-personnel-from-illegitimate-investigation-by-the-international-criminal-court
/index.html.
233. See, e.g., Statement of Lawyer and Legal Scholars Against U.S. Sanctions on ICC 
Investigators of Atrocities, STAN. L. SCH. (June 2020);https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2020/07/STATEMENT-OF-LAWYERS-AND-LEGAL-SCHOLARS-
AGAINST-U.S.-SANCTIONS-ON-ICC-INVESTIGATORS-OF-ATROCITIES-June-
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ties “reconfirm[ed their] unwavering support for the Court as an independ-
ent and impartial institution” and reiterated their commitment to defend the 
ICC “against measures or threats” against it.
234
Yet, it remains unclear what 
practical impact this acknowledgment of support will have. When faced 
with standing their ground on support for the ICC or being pressured by the 
world’s greatest superpower, States Parties are placed between the figura-
tive rock and hard place, and when put in similar predicaments in the past, 
they have sided with the United States.
235
In January 2021, the United States experienced a shift to a presidential 
administration led by President Joseph Biden. On April 1, 2021, President 
Biden issued an Executive Order terminating the “national emergency” ref-
erenced in President Trump’s June 2020 Executive Order and lifting the 
sanctions imposed by the Trump Administration on ICC personnel.
236
How-
ever, in doing so, President Biden specifically noted the U.S. Government’s 
sustained objections to the ICC’s “assertions of jurisdiction over personnel 
of such non-States Parties as the United States and its allies absent their 
consent or referral by the United Nations Security Council.”
237
He further 
maintained that the United States “will vigorously protect current and for-
mer United States personnel from any attempts to exercise such jurisdic-
tion.”
238
While the ICC may experience better relations with the United States 
under the Biden Administration than it did under the Trump Administration, 
it is highly unlikely that President Biden will return to the levels of coopera-
2020.pdf; Oppose Trump Administration Measures against the International Court, HUM.
RTS. WATCH (June 11, 2020), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2020/07/2020-
07-07%20Oppose%20Trump%20Administration%20Measures%20against%20the%20
International%20Criminal%20Court.pdf (statement of a number of non-governmental and 
civil society organizations, including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International USA 
against the United States’ sanctions); International Criminal Justice: Statement by the High 
Representative Following the US Decision on Possible Sanctions Related to the International 
Criminal Court, EUR. UNION EXTERNAL ACTION SERV. (June 16, 2020), 
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/80954/international-criminal-
justice-statement-high-representative-following-us-decision-possible_en (statement by the 
European Union High Representative reconfirming the European Union’s “unwavering sup-
port” for the ICC in light of U.S. sanctions).
234. Statement in Support of the International Criminal Court (ICC) Following the Re-
lease of the US Executive Order of 11 June 2020, PERMANENT MISSION FR. (June 23, 2020), 
https://onu.delegfrance.org/We-remain-committed-to-an-international-rules-based-order.
235. PARIS, supra note 53, at 70–74 (discussing the U.S. Government’s execution of 
bilateral agreements with 102 nations in which both parties promised not to surrender each 
other’s nationals to the ICC, many of which were negotiated by the United States under threat 
of withdrawing foreign aid on which the other nations were dependent).
236. Executive Order on the Termination of Emergency with Respect to the International 
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tion the ICC enjoyed under President Obama in 2008-2015—who publicly 
ended American hostilities against the ICC and even voted in favor of a Se-
curity Council resolution that referred the Libya Situation to the ICC and 
lobbied other Council members to do the same.
239
At the time of publication,  
the Prosecutor’s investigation into Afghanistan remains ongoing, and the 
impact of this investigation on the U.S.-ICC relationship as well as the 
ICC’s standing on the global stage remains to be seen.
Regardless of what the future holds, the United States, like Kenya, has 
proven through its campaign of anti-ICC rhetoric and disinformation just 
how susceptible the ICC is to political pressures and public opinion. Nota-
bly, the Trump Administration’s propaganda war has severely impacted the 
ICC’s perceived legitimacy. Through the Pre-Trial Chamber’s ruling deny-
ing the Prosecutor’s request to open an investigation, many were left believ-
ing that the ICC could be easily swayed by political pressures exerted by a 
global superpower. Not only did this promote a perception of the ICC as a 
weak entity, but it also reiterated a mentality that the ICC will “stay in its 
lane” and continue to investigate and prosecute only those nations with a 
weak pull on the geopolitical stage, while avoiding those who can easily so-
licit global public opinion. Despite the Trial Chamber’s accurate application 
of the law, suspicions remain whether its ruling reversing the Pre-Trial 
Chamber and permitting Bensouda’s investigation to proceed was—at least 
partially—the result of pressures exerted by ICC supporters, including 
States Parties, following the Pre-Trial Chamber’s denial. This change in po-
sition presents the ICC as disconnected and inconsistent and portrays it as 
easily malleable to public opinion.
Despite the procedural inaccuracies plaguing the Pre-Trial Chamber’s 
Decision, the Trial Chamber’s approval of the investigation presents another 
array of practical issues for the Prosecutor and the ICC. Proceeding with an 
investigation into U.S. crimes, when the U.S. Government has adamantly
refused to provide any assistance and has indeed blocked the investigation 
at every stage, appears to be setting the ICC up for failure. This is especially 
true considering the success the obstructionist approach earned Kenyatta 
and Ruto. A failed case against the United States holds the potential to fur-
ther curtail the ICC’s power and permanently undermine its legitimacy and 
authority.
240
  Unfortunately a decision to withdraw from the investigation at 
this stage would validate the United States’ bully tactics. While a case 
against U.S. officials would be a huge success for the ICC in terms of 
achieving justice over impunity and fostering greater respect for the rule of 
law, the cost of the case—in terms of undermining the ICC’s legitimacy—
could be overwhelming.
239. Sara L. Ochs, The United States, The International Criminal Court, and the Situa-
tion in Afghanistan, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. REFLECTION 89, 92 (2019).
240. An investigation into the United States also makes future prospects for Security 
Council referrals highly unlikely. Sterio, supra note 170, at 473.
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V.  Limiting the Impact of Propaganda Warfare
When asked about his reaction to the U.S. Executive Order authorizing 
sanctions against the court, ICC President Chile Eboe-Osuji stated, “In any 
system in which the rule of law is respected, courts are never coerced. They 
may be criticized—even robustly. But never coerced.”
241
However, the suc-
cess of Kenya’s propaganda campaign against the ICC throws Judge Eboe-
Osuji’s statement into question. Kenya and its supporters have shown that it 
is possible, through prolonged and effective use of anti-ICC sentiment and 
widespread propaganda, to force the ICC’s hand and to dictate its rulings in 
certain cases. This weakness has translated into the ICC’s perceived bias, 
which has fundamentally “damaged States Parties’ understandings of the 
independence and fairness of the ICC.”
242
The past success of propaganda 
also paves the way for future attacks.
The reality is that the ICC is a court fundamentally subject to the will of 
its States Parties, as well as to the pressures of powerful non-States Parties. 
Moreover, because those states that carry political influence on the geopolit-
ical stage are the most capable of militarizing widespread public opinion, 
the ICC is often forced to cater to the most powerful nations, further exacer-
bating the political influence on the ICC.
243
While greater State Party membership—especially among superpow-
ers—is a powerful enforcement mechanism, and a less reliant relationship 
on the U.N. Security Council could significantly increase the ICC’s power 
and ability to defend itself against propaganda wars, these changes are high-
ly unlikely. Not only is the Rome Statute’s amendment process quite exten-
sive,
244
but these new measures would require states—including those su-
perpowers like the United States, China, and Russia—to surrender even 
greater sovereignty. In the current political climate, such change is idealistic 
at best. Another less palatable option is for the ICC to fully embrace its po-
litical nature, with the Prosecutor selecting to investigate only non-
controversial matters that would not anger powerful states.
245
This approach 
would allow the Prosecutor, and by extension, the ICC, to avoid contentious 
241. Tom O’Connor, ICC President Condemns ‘Unprecedented’ U.S. Attack on Interna-
tional Court, NEWSWEEK (June 22, 2020, 5:32 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/icc-
president-unprecedented-us-attack-court-1512541.
242. True-Frost, supra note 43, at 263.
243. ICC PROSECUTOR 2019-2021 STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 165, ¶ 8(b).
244. Kevin Jon Heller, The Rome Statute’s Flawed Amendment Regime—Starvation in 
NIAC Edition, OPINIO JURIS (July 12, 2019), http://opiniojuris.org/2019/12/07/the-rome-
statutes-flawed-amendment-regime-starvation-in-niac-edition/.
245. See Allen S. Weiner, Prudent Politics: The International Criminal Court, Interna-
tional Relations, and Prosecutorial Independence, 12 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 545, 
546 (2013) (making the “scandalous” argument that the ICC Prosecutor “needs to make care-
ful and self-conscious political choices regarding charging strategies, particularly during the 
formative stages of the tribunal, in order to enhance the effectiveness and international stand-
ing of the institution”).
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cases in hopes of pleasing the countries with the loudest voices while 
drowning out those who lack the same international platform. And although 
some strategic case selection by the Prosecutor is necessary, allowing selec-
tion to be guided primarily by political motivations runs contrary to the pur-
pose of the Rome Statute. It would allow cases most deserving of prosecu-
tion to be met with impunity, simply because the perpetrators come from a 
nation that holds significant geopolitical power. Impunity is not what was 
envisioned during the creation of the ICC, nor what should be expected of 
its future. In the long run, allowing politics to guide the ICC’s direction 
would do more damage to the ICC’s legitimacy, and would contribute to an 
image of the ICC as too weak to take on politically controversial cases.
The key to minimizing the detrimental impact of propaganda wars 
against the ICC’s operations appears to lie in promoting the ICC’s perceived 
legitimacy, both within States Parties as well as non-States Parties. In dem-
ocratic nations, appealing directly to nationals could work to impose pres-
sures on state governments to foster deeper relationships with the ICC. 
Promoting the ICC’s perceived legitimacy will correlatively improve the 
level of cooperation the ICC receives.
246
Accordingly, it is imperative that 
the ICC improve its perceived legitimacy first and foremost among its 
States Parties. Doing so will promote cooperation in the event that a State 
Party comes under investigation by the ICC Prosecutor, yet, even more im-
portantly, it will solicit support among States Parties to pressure non-
compliant states to cooperate with the ICC. The failure of States Parties to 
respond to non-compliant states has contributed to many of the ICC’s fail-
ings, and as both Prosecutor Bensouda and ICC President Eboe-Osuji rec-
ognize, States Parties must act in the face of non-compliance.
247
The need 
for greater perceived legitimacy is also necessary among nationals of non-
States Parties. Increased legitimacy throughout non-States Parties could 
both help in increasing ICC membership and in tempering non-State Party 
propaganda warfare.
Obtaining greater success in prosecutions that publicly appear to be fair 
and unbiased should be the primary focus in promoting the ICC’s legitima-
cy. Understandably, empirical research suggests that “people are most likely 
to support the ICC when they believe international organizations are effec-
246. True-Frost, supra note 43, at 315. 
247. Statement, Int’l Crim. Ct., Full Statement of the Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, on 
External Expert Review and Lessons Drawn from the Kenya Situation, Annex 1, ICC OTP 
Kenya Cases: Review and Recommendations: Executive Summary of the Report of the Exter-
nal Independent Experts, at 5 (Nov. 26, 2019) (recognizing that one of the reasons for the
Prosecutor’s failure to effectively prosecute the Kenyan cases was that “States Parties [did 
not] seem to have the political will to pressure the [Kenyan Government] to act consistent 
with its obligations under the Statute and to refrain from allowing interference with and/or 
interfering with the OTP criminal justice activities”); O’Connor, supra note 241 (reflecting 
Judge Eboe-Osuji’s statement that an attack against the ICC is not only an attack against the 
judicial mechanism itself, but on the 123 States Parties as well).
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tive and unbiased.”
248
Both the Prosecutor and the Independent Expert Re-
view of the ICC solicited by the Assembly of States Parties
249
have proposed 
numerous strategies to achieve more effective investigations and prosecu-
tions, including obtaining a stronger evidentiary base at an early stage in 
every case;
250
working more closely with national investigative and prosecu-
torial agencies and hiring more investigators, analysts and prosecutors from 
diverse backgrounds, so as to be more equipped to navigate culturally diffi-
cult investigations;
251
and implementing a more regular and effective review 
of standards and practices.
252
Significant changes in investigatory and prose-
cutorial strategy may also result with the upcoming transition in ICC prose-
cutorial leadership, with Karim Khan scheduled to replace Fatou Bensouda 
as ICC Prosecutor and begin his nine-year term in June 2021.
253
To truly improve its perceived legitimacy, the ICC must also make a se-
ries of practical changes in its operations to complement these strategical 
modifications, including both modifications to how the Prosecutor addresses 
its relationships with nationals of States Parties and non-States Parties, as 
well as how it handles issues of non-compliance during investigations. The 
ICC must foster legitimacy through outreach and establish a presence on the 
ground in post-conflict States when possible. It must also effectively culti-
vate a better public image by developing stronger public relations and 
communications strategies. Finally, the ICC and the Assembly of States Par-
ties must appropriately address issues of state non-compliance in order to 
deter future obstructionist campaigns.
A. Fostering Legitimacy through Outreach & Presence
The ICC’s susceptibility to propaganda and the spread of disinfor-
mation, as evidenced in both the Kenya and Afghanistan Situations, can 
largely be traced to a lack of knowledge about and unrealistic expectations 
248. Kelebogile Zvobgo, The Trump Administration opposes the International Criminal 
Court. Do Americans Agree? WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2019, 1:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/28/trump-administration-opposes-
international-criminal-court-do-americans-agree/.
249. Int’l Crim. Ct. Assembly of States Parties Res. ICC-ASP/18/Res. 7, ¶ 6, Review of 
the International Criminal Court and the Rome Statute System (Dec. 6, 2019).
250. ICC PROSECUTOR 2019-2021 STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 165, ¶ 14(a). By front-
loading the investigations, especially before any charges or summons are announced, the 
Prosecutor faces less risk of State non-compliance that may arise after the announcement of 
charges, as was the case in the Kenya Situation. 
251. Id. ¶ 16.
252. Id. ¶ 17; see Independent Expert Review of the international Criminal Court and the 
Rome Statute System Final Report, ICC-ASP/18/Res.7, at 117–18; 258–59 (Sept. 30, 2020) 
[hereinafter ICC Expert Review]. 
253. Press Release, Int’l Crim. Ct., Assembly of States Parties concludes the second re-
sumption of its nineteenth session (Feb. 12, 2021), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages
/item.aspx?name=pr1567.
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of the ICC by nationals of States Parties and non-States Parties alike.
254
As 
the current ICC Office of the Prosecutor has lamented, “affected communi-
ties and members of the public often expect the Office [of the Prosecutor] to 
exercise jurisdiction in the most serious situations of conflict and criminality 
around the world, including situations where the ICC has no jurisdiction.”
255
Unrealistic expectations of the ICC are unfortunately all too common given 
the lack of widespread global understanding of the ICC’s complexities, such 
as its jurisdictional reach or its principle of complementarity.
Kenya demonstrated just how serious of a concern a lack of national 
knowledge about the ICC can be. As Yvonne Dutton has explained,
Poor communication led victims to have unrealistic expectations 
about what the ICC could achieve in Kenya—resulting in victims 
becoming dissatisfied with the Court’s progress. It comes as no 
surprise that the public did not mobilize on behalf of the ICC when 
the public in “some parts of Kenya that bore the brunt of the vio-
lence” was “barely aware” of the Court.
256
This lack of knowledge led to Kenyans being easily swayed by their po-
litical leaders’ misrepresentations about the ICC. The same problem—lack 
of knowledge and familiarity with the ICC—is evident in the United States. 
This problem is most aptly summarized by Richard Dicker of Human Rights 
Watch who has said:
Americans don’t really pay much attention to these sorts of foreign 
policy things, which is why the media don’t bother investigating or 
explaining… This is sad because I believe that if we were success-
ful in getting information out to people, they would see that there is 
no contradiction between their deeply held values and what the In-
ternational Criminal Court stands for.
257
Dicker’s statement has epistemological support. A 2018 study conduct-
ed by Ipsos identified that seventy-three percent of the 1,004 adult Ameri-
cans polled supported “international organizations that ‘support human 
rights and hold individuals accountable for mass atrocities.’”
258
Yet, only 
forty-five percent of the Americans polled were aware of the existence of 
the ICC.
259
Of those who admitted awareness, relatively few had a basic 
knowledge of the ICC, with sixty-two percent incorrectly believing that the 
254. The Real Story, Podcast: Has the International Criminal Court Failed?, BBC:
(Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/w3csydcn.
255. ICC PROSECUTOR 2019-2021 STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 165, ¶ 8(a).
256. Dutton, supra note 6, at 106.
257. PARIS, supra note 53, at 67.
258. Study of Americans who Know about the ICC – Number of Americans Who Support 
the ICC Grows, IPSOS (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news
/documents/2018-04/american_bar_association-factum-2018_04_11.pdf 
259. Id.
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United States is a State Party.
260
Given this general lack of knowledge, stud-
ies have reflected that Americans are heavily reliant on publicly made ar-
guments, including those from partisan political leaders, to form their opin-
ions regarding the ICC,
261
making the Trump Administration’s propaganda 
war that much more damaging. While anti-ICC rhetoric dominates the me-
dia, the voices of ICC supporters are less publicized. Outside of the occa-
sional editorial opinion or tweet by a high-profile politician with a sizable 
following,
262
much of the opposition to Trump’s propaganda war can be 
found on scholarly blogs or on other outlets primarily targeting audiences 
who are already knowledgeable about the ICC. As a result, much of what 
the American public at large has heard about the ICC is the Trump Admin-
istration’s unsupported and biased claims and its retaliatory response to the 
ICC’s lawful investigation.
Since knowledge and understanding of the ICC is fundamental to the 
ICC’s legitimacy, and, by extension, states’ willingness to cooperate with 
investigations, critical resources need to be devoted to ICC outreach. The 
ICC’s External Expert Review identifies outreach efforts as opportunities 
for the ICC to “win the confidence, support, and cooperation of people and 
communities that have often been traumatised and scarred by the events the 
ICC is investigating.”
263
The ICC has fallen flat in outreach especially in re-
cent years. In its nascent years, the ICC adopted a “low-profile approach” to 
outreach, conducting outreach missions on an ad hoc basis by staff perma-
nently based in the Hague.
264
This approach presented a perception that the 
ICC was disengaged from the people directly impacted by the cases which it 
investigated.
265
While the ICC’s outreach improved for several years, espe-
cially once a dedicated Outreach Unit was finally established in 2007,
266
out-
reach no longer seems to be one of the ICC’s primary objectives. Instead, 
recent outreach efforts have been informationally and culturally insufficient 
for recipients to understand and appreciate the ICC’s role in a particular sit-
260. Id. Other researchers encountered a similar problem. In a 2019 study of 1,020 
online participants, about half had no prior knowledge of the ICC, and even those with 
knowledge were not deeply familiar. Zvobgo, supra note 248.
261. Zvobgo, supra note 248.
262. See Bernie Sanders (@SenSanders), TWITTER (Sept. 2, 2020, 3:42 PM), 
https://twitter.com/SenSanders/status/1301244152634585091 (in which Senator and 2020 
Presidential Candidate Bernie Sanders tweeted “Sanctioning the [ICC] shows once again that 
Trump is on the side of authoritarians around the world. The United States should be working 
to strengthen international human rights standards, not targeting officials who uphold them.”).
263. ICC Expert Review, supra note 252, at 125–26.
264. Sara Darehshori, Lessons for Outreach from the Ad Hoc Tribunals, The Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, and the International Criminal Court, 14 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 299, 303 (2008).
265. Id.
266. The ICC also improved on its outreach initiatives in the third situation to open be-
fore the Court, in which the ICC opened a field office in the Central African Republic within 
five months of commencing criminal investigations. Id. at 303, 306.
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uation.
267
While the ICC publicized and evaluated its outreach efforts in an-
nual reports from 2007 to 2010, its most recent report is more than a decade 
old.
268
Moreover, outreach initiatives were not addressed in the 2019-2021 
Strategic Plans issued by the Office of the Prosecutor
269
or the ICC’s Regis-
try, the organ of the ICC responsible for conducting outreach,
270
and de-
mands for the ICC to rejuvenate its outreach program have gone largely un-
addressed.
271
To cure its current perceived legitimacy crisis, caused by repeated
propaganda wars, the ICC must revitalize its outreach program. Specifically, 
the ICC needs to approach the concept of outreach with the goal of educat-
ing the global populace at large about the ICC and its operations.
272
Out-
reach should largely be based around the idea “that when stakeholders un-
derstand the issues and are engaged in a justice institution’s work, support 
will likely follow.”
273
Accordingly, opportunities should also be given for 
the populace to question the ICC and express their expectations and criti-
cisms.
274
Permitting civilian feedback and incorporating this feedback into 
future strategic plans will help bring local involvement into the ICC and will 
mold a court more responsive to the public’s expectations, thereby directly 
improving the ICC’s perceived legitimacy.
For States Parties under prosecutorial investigation, it is especially im-
portant that the ICC use outreach to connect with the local communities and 
foster support of the ICC’s initiatives in that state. Doing so will inspire 
greater governmental cooperation and will more easily combat potential 
propaganda utilized by the defendants subject to ICC investigation. Out-
reach should be instituted early in the case process, throughout the prelimi-
nary examination stage.
275
In considering how best to connect with the pub-
267. ICC Expert Review, supra note 252, at 126 (also recognizing that outreach efforts 
have encountered “significant delays”).
268. Interacting with Communities Affected by Crimes, INT’L CRIM. CT.,
https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/interacting-with-communities (last visited Sept. 10, 2020) 
(providing Outreach Reports only for 2007-2010).
269. ICC PROSECUTOR 2019-2021 STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 165.
270. Registry Strategic Plan (2019-2021), ¶ 3 (July 17, 2019), https://www.icc-cpi.int
/itemsDocuments/190717-reg-strategic-plan-eng.pdf.
271. See generally, e.g., Dutton, supra note 6 (recommending that the ICC engage in 
greater in-person outreach); NO PEACE WITHOUT JUSTICE, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT’S FIELD PRESENCE (2009), http://www.npwj.org/sites/default/files/documents/File
/Field%20Operations%20Paper%20November%202009.pdf (calling for the States Parties and 
organs of the ICC to consider using ICC field offices to improve state-Court relations).
272. Alison Smith, Outreach and the Kosovo Specialist Chambers: A Civil Society Prac-
titioner’s Perspective, 20 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 125, 130 (2020).
273. Id.
274. See id. (noting that effective court outreach will be “bi-directional”).
275. Id. at 132–33; see also Darehshori, supra note 264, at 303–04 (noting that had it not 
failed to institute early outreach in Uganda, the ICC could have mitigated a negative percep-
tion widely held by the Ugandan public).
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lic in States Parties, the ICC should consider the outreach successes 
achieved by several hybrid tribunals,
276
such as the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone,
277
and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia,
278
both of which were located in-state. The Sierra Leonean Court, for instance, 
developed a beneficial relationship with the local media that facilitated ac-
cessibility of its proceedings to the general population in Sierra Leone.
279
The Cambodian Tribunal likewise engaged in significant and effective out-
reach throughout Cambodia by facilitating the visits of hundreds of thou-
sands of Cambodians to the tribunal to attend court proceedings.
280
Arguably, the best way to promote a better view of the ICC among the 
communities it is designed to serve is to develop an on-the-ground presence, 
as was effectively done in Sierra Leone and Cambodia. As a permanent in-
ternational court, the ICC is primarily seated in the Hague, far removed 
from nearly all of the situations it investigates.
281
This lack of presence is 
incredibly damaging to the ICC in terms of legitimacy because it creates a 
perception of far-removed justice. Legitimacy and location are inextricably 
intertwined; in the minds of victims and members of post-conflict societies, 
“geographic distance equates to institutional indifference.”
282
Communities 
cannot enjoy a sense of local ownership over or connection to the justice 
process when this is occurring worlds away from where they are located, 
especially when the trials are not widely publicized in the post-conflict 
state.
283
The ICC, however, has a means of fostering this local ownership. 
276. Hybrid tribunals blend characteristics of domestic and international courts by typi-
cally sitting in the state where the crimes at issue were committed; staffing international and 
domestic judges, lawyers, and staff; and applying a mix of international and domestic law and 
procedures. Beth Van Schaack, The Building Blocks of Hybrid Justice, 44 DENV. J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 169, 172–73 (2016).
277. Dutton, supra note 6, at 92 (recognizing the Special Court for Sierra Leone as the 
“gold standard of tribunal outreach initiatives”).
278. JOHN D. CIORCIARI & ANNE HEINDEL, HYBRID JUSTICE: THE EXTRAORDINARY 
CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA 271 (2014) (noting that as of 2014, the Cambodian 
Tribunal had surpassed all other international courts in terms of outreach).
279. See Patrick Vinck & Phuong N. Pham, Outreach Evaluation: The International 
Criminal Court in the Central African Republic, 4 INT’L J. TRANS. JUST. 421, 423 (2010).
280. CIORCIARI & HEINDEL, supra note 278, at 240–41.
281. Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 3(1); Headquarters Agreement between the Inter-
national Criminal Court and the Host State, ICC-BD/04-01-08 (Mar. 1, 2008), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/99A82721-ED93-4088-B84D-7B8ADA4DD062
/280775/ICCBD040108ENG1.pdf.
282. Frank Dame, The Effect of International Criminal Tribunals on Local Judicial Cul-
ture: The Superiority of the Hybrid Tribunal, 24 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 211, 246 (2015).
283. Id.; see also David Cohen, “Hybrid” Justice in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and 
Cambodia: “Lessons Learned” and Prospects for the Future, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (2007) 
(noting that victims can easily dismiss the processes of far removed international courts as 
being “imposed by foreign countries and organizations who have misunderstood what really 
happened”); William W. Burke-White, Regionalization of International Criminal Law En-
forcement: A Preliminary Exploration, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 729, 736 (2003) (recognizing that
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Under Rome Statute article 3, the ICC, in its discretion, may sit in a location 
outside of the Hague, “whenever it considers it desirable.”
284
Yet, despite 
repeated calls for the ICC to sit locally,
285
some of which it has openly con-
sidered,
286
to date, the ICC has yet to conduct any trials outside of the 
Hague.
Temporarily re-locating the ICC locally would bring “a psychological 
proximity and sense of connection with the local community,” that would 
directly enhance the ICC’s perceived legitimacy.
287
Rather than being per-
ceived as a foreign court imposing justice without any direct stake in the 
community, the ICC could better portray itself as an institution designed to 
provide transitional and restorative justice to post-conflict communities. 
This change in venue would also provide for greater in-person outreach 
measures and improve the public’s knowledge of the ICC’s workings. 
Moreover, conducting ICC proceedings locally would foster significant 
transitional justice benefits that are currently lacking in the ICC. As a local 
court, the ICC could engage directly in capacity building measures to train 
local judges and prosecutors.
288
These benefits are evident in the work of 
various hybrid tribunals located in post-conflict states.
289
Many of these tri-
bunals, including the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, 
the hybrid tribunal created to prosecute atrocities committed in Cambodia 
during the 1970s Khmer Rouge regime have engaged in outreach efforts 
that have far surpassed the ICC and the ad hoc international criminal tribu-
nals.
290
In fact, given in its location in Cambodia, the Cambodian tribunal 
has succeeded in facilitating the visits of significant number of Khmer 
Rouge victims or victims’ relatives to the tribunal to attend court hearings.
291
By sitting locally and adopting the hybrid tribunals’ approach to outreach, 
“when a tribunal is perceived as a foreign agent, imposing its will on a national system, it 
quickly loses credibility”).
284. Rome Statute, supra note 55, art. 3(3).
285. Angelique Lu, Bangladesh’s Rohingya Refugees Lobby ICC to Sit in Asia During 
War Crimes Investigation, ABC NEWS (Aug. 31, 2020), https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-
09-01/bangladesh-rohingya-international-criminal-court-asia-refugees/12571818 (reporting 
recent calls by lawyers representing Rohingya victims for the ICC to sit in Asia to resolve 
cases within the Situation in Bangladesh and Myanmar).
286. Stuart Ford, The International Criminal Court and Proximity to the Scene of the 
Crime: Does the Rome Statute Permit all of the ICC’s Trials to Take Place at Local or Re-
gional Chambers? 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 715, 716 (2010) (recognizing that the ICC agreed 
to consider Tanzania’s offer to host ICC trials at the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda’s facilities in Arusha, Tanzania, yet never took action on this proposal).
287. Burke-White, supra note 283, at 736.
288. Id. at 735–36.
289. Sara L. Ochs, A Renewed Call for Hybrid Tribunals, 52 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL., 
351, 397–99 (2020) (discussing the restorative and transitional justice provided by in-state 
hybrid tribunals in the form of local ownership).  
290. Id. at 387 (citing CIORCIARI & HEINDEL, supra note 278, at 271).
291. Id.
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the ICC can bring practical change to the domestic legal systems of the 
post-conflict states where it conducts investigations and can thus can gener-
ate a legacy of legitimacy within the state and greater region that will re-
main beyond its stay.
Of course, sitting locally would not be practical for all or even most 
cases, and would only be possible in states with a certain level of stability 
and where the state’s government supports the ICC’s investigation.
292
Thus, 
in circumstances where a state seeks to use a propaganda war against the 
ICC—like in Kenya or the United States—security concerns and potential 
political interference in ICC operations would outweigh any transitional jus-
tice or outreach benefit. Yet, by sitting locally when possible, the ICC can 
cultivate greater legitimacy and knowledge and directly improve the pub-
lic’s perception of its legitimacy.
Attention must also be given to outreach in States Parties not subject to 
investigation, as well as in non-States Parties. As the ICC’s Independent 
Expert Report notes, the ICC needs to further promote outreach by enhanc-
ing coordination with civil society organizations.
293
For instance, initiatives 
like the Coalition for the ICC and the American Bar Association’s ICC Pro-
ject in the United States have made great strides in explaining and highlight-
ing the ICC to the general population.
294
However, their collective reach re-
mains constrained by ineffective communication with the Office of the 
Prosecutor.
295
By investing greater time and resources directly into direct 
outreach measures and greater collaboration with civil society organizations 
in both States Parties and non-States Parties, the ICC can foster knowledge 
of, involvement in, and connection to the ICC that is currently lacking, and 
in doing so, inspire greater state cooperation in future investigations.
B. Enhancing Public Image
In addition to fostering knowledge of the ICC through expanded out-
reach and presence, one of the most straightforward and practical measures 
the ICC can adopt to promote its legitimacy is a better approach to public 
relations. As a result of the ICC’s lack of an integrated or comprehensive 
communications strategy,
296
it is currently suffering from a number of public 
relations challenges and has recently been plagued by a dysfunctional, elitist 
image. Notably, experts have noted a “breakdown in collegiality” between 
292. Ford, supra note 286, at 718.
293. ICC Expert Review, supra note 252, at 123.
294. See generally What We Do, COAL. FOR INT’L CRIM. CT., 
https://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/about/what-we-do (last visited Jan. 5, 2021) (outlining the 
work of the Coalition for the ICC); American Bar Association’s International Criminal Court 
Project, ABA-ICC PROJECT, https://www.aba-icc.org/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2021) (explaining 
that this project aims to support the ICC and US-ICC relations “through advocacy, education, 
and practical legal assistance”).
295. ICC Expert Review, supra note 252, at 122.
296. Id. at 124.
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the Office of the Prosecutor and the ICC judges as well as among the judges 
themselves.
297
Even worse, a publicized internal battle between ICC admin-
istration and judges demanding higher salaries is contributing to a widely 
held perception of the ICC as “an elite institution whose members are out of 
tune with reality.”
298
Moreover, while the ICC’s failings and negative attrib-
utes are often widely reported, their achievements are much less so. As Stu-
art Ford concluded after synthesizing a number of recent empirical studies,
the ICC has succeeded in preventing violence and successfully reducing the 
global number of serious human rights abuses.
299
Yet, conclusions such as 
Professor Ford’s are often drowned out by the criticisms of the ICC’s more 
tangible failures, such as the dismissal of charges against Ruto and Kenyat-
ta.
Recent events further indicate the ICC’s need for greater publicity of its 
achievements. For instance, in early September, several esteemed news out-
lets, including the New York Times,300 reported that two soldiers of the My-
anmar Army had confessed on video to committing crimes against Rohing-
ya Muslims pursuant to genocidal orders.
301
The New York Times further re-
reported that the men had been transferred to ICC custody on September 7, 
2020, for further detention and questioning.
302
Given that the Prosecutor has 
opened a propio motu investigation into crimes against the Rohingya com-
mitted in Myanmar,
303
acquiring custody over two soldiers willing to testify 
as to genocidal intent would be considered a great victory for the ICC Pros-
ecutor. Yet, without explanation, the ICC and the Prosecutor have remained 
silent, refusing to confirm or deny custody of the two men. Not only does 
this fail to publicize a worthy prosecutorial accomplishment in a high-
profile case, but in the event that the men are not actually in custody—
297. Sterio, supra note 170, at 471; Douglas Guilfoyle, Part II-This is not fine: The In-
ternational Criminal Court in Trouble, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org
/part-ii-this-is-not-fine-the-international-criminal-court-in-trouble/. 
298. Sterio, supra note 170, at 473.
299. Stuart Ford, Can the International Criminal Court Succeed? An Analysis of the 
Empirical Evidence of Violence Prevention, 43 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 101, 119–
20 (2020).
300. Two Myanmar Soldiers Taken to the Hague After Confessing to Rohingya Killings: 
Reports, REUTERS (Sept. 8, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya
/two-myanmar-soldiers-taken-to-the-hague-after-confessing-to-rohingya-killings-reports-
idUSKBN25Z1KD (noting that the news had been reported by the New York Times, the Cana-
dian Broadcasting Corporation, and the human rights group Fortify Rights).
301. Hannah Beech, ‘Kill all You See’: In a First, Myanmar Soldiers Tell of Rohingya 
Slaughter, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2020) (explaining that in video testimony, the men confessed 
that they obeyed orders from their commanding officers to “kill all you see, whether children 
or adults”); Nahlah Ayed, Once Foot Soldiers in Myanmar’s Army, Now Potential Witnesses 
to Mass Atrocities, CBC NEWS (Sept. 8, 2020), https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/myanmar-
soldiers-custody-hague-1.5715272.
302. Beech, supra note 301.
303. Bangladesh/Myanmar, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/bangladesh-
myanmar (last visited Sept. 14, 2020).
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which has been lightly debated
304
—then the ICC’s failure to formally dis-
pute the reporting contributes to a lack of transparency that clouds general 
knowledge of the ICC’s work. Either way, a strong public relations ap-
proach and straightforward, court-wide communications strategy would 
have handled this situation much differently.
And while public relations do not fall directly within the ICC’s man-
date, it is a necessary evil that the ICC must consider in seeking to boost its 
perceived legitimacy. This is especially necessary considering that some of 
the exact individuals whom the Prosecutor is targeting use public relations 
firms to boost their own global image and to further their propaganda wars 
against the ICC.
305
As an example, Kenyatta hired the British public rela-
tions firm BTP Advisers to assist in his 2013 election campaign, which 
“used their local and international networks to present the ICC as a machi-
nation of Western powers.”
306
While Kenyatta and Ruto are assumed to be 
responsible for painting the ICC as a neo-colonialist institution, ironically, 
the blame for this is likely better attributed to white British spin-doctors. By 
not taking full advantage of public relations and effective communications 
opportunities, the ICC is placing itself at an even greater disadvantage to 
powerful nations. Idealistically a court should never have to rely on publici-
ty; however, for a court like the ICC, which is fully dependent on support 
and legitimacy, failing to utilize public relations will further hamper its abil-
ity to conduct effective investigations and prosecutions.
C. Stronger Consequences for Noncompliance
Propaganda warfare is so devastating because it is often supplement-
ed—as done by Kenya and threatened by the United States—by a refusal to 
cooperate with ICC investigations or prosecutions. As discussed at length, 
the ICC can only function effectively when its States Parties cooperate with 
the ICC.
307
And while increased outreach and better public relations can in-
spire greater cooperation, the Rome Statute’s current compliance scheme 
provides no definitive punitive recourse against non-compliant States.
308
Ar-
304. Two Myanmar Soldiers Taken to the Hague, supra note 300 (reporting that an ICC 
spokesperson denied that the ICC had the men in custody).
305. See generally CORP. EUR. OBSERVATORY, SPIN DOCTORS TO THE AUTOCRATS:
HOW EUROPEAN PR FIRMS WHITEWASH REPRESSIVE REGIMES (2015) available at 
https://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/20150120_spindoctors_mr.pdf (explaining that 
many autocratic regimes, including those currently subject to investigation by the ICC Prose-
cutor, such as Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Israel, use European 
public relations firms to improve their global image).
306. Id. at 34.
307. Ali, supra note 38, at 415 (arguing that without enforcement mechanisms to ensure 
compliance, “the ICC will be extremely ineffective in its mandate to administer justice”).
308. Joseph M. Isanga, The International Criminal Court Ten Years Later: Appraisal 
and Prospects, 21 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 235, 246–47 (2013) (noting that after ten 
years, Article 87 “has not been able to force state parties to comply with their duty to cooper-
ate”).
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ticle 87 provides for the referral of non-compliant States Parties to the As-
sembly of States Parties or—in the event that the non-compliance relates to 
a Security Council-referred Situation—to the Security Council, but it fails to 
delineate what actions either the Assembly of States Parties or the Security 
Council may take upon referral.
309
Kenya’s largely unpunished non-compliance drew glaring light on the 
Rome Statute’s enforcement deficiencies. Despite the Trial Chamber’s ini-
tial refusal to formally find Kenya non-compliant, in response to the Prose-
cution’s appeal,
310
the Trial Chamber issued a decision in 2016—following 
the termination of charges against both Kenyatta and Ruto—declaring the 
Kenyan Government non-compliant under article 87 and referring it to the 
Assembly of States Parties.
311
However, Kenya does not appear to have 
faced any real consequence from the Assembly of States Parties following 
its referral. Instead, the 2016 Assembly of States Parties Report of the Bu-
reau on non-Cooperation simply made a note of the Trial Chamber’s finding 
of non-compliance but failed to acknowledge any punitive action taken 
against Kenya in response to the finding.
312
As a result, not only did the 
Kenyan defendants escape liability for alleged crimes against humanity, but 
they further avoided any consequence for their stark violations of the Rome 
Statute.
313
To guarantee more committed cooperation by States Parties, the ICC 
needs to encourage modifications to its compliance scheme. However, ra-
ther than amending the Rome Statute, it should call upon the Assembly of 
States Parties, which is composed of representatives of States Parties to the 
Rome Statute and acts as the ICC’s “management oversight and legislative 
309. Rome Statute, supra note 55, at  art. 87(7); Annie Wartanian, The ICC Prosecutor’s
Battlefield: Combating Atrocities While Fighting for States’ Cooperation Lessons from the 
U.N. Tribunals Applied to the Case of Uganda, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1289, 1298 (2005); 
Barnes, supra note 66, at 1616.
310. Prosecution appeal against the “Decision on Prosecution’s application for a finding 
of noncompliance under Article 87(7) of the Statute,” ICC-01/09-02/11 (Mar. 20, 2015), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2014_09899.PDF.
311. Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Second decision on Prosecu-
tion’s application for a finding of non-compliance under Article 87(7) of the Statute, at 17-18, 
ICC-01/09-02/11 (Sept. 19, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_
06654.PDF.
312. See generally Assembly of States Parties Report of the Bureau on non-cooperation, 
ICC-ASP/15/131 (Nov. 8, 2016), https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP15/ICC-ASP-
15-31-ENG.pdf (acknowledging the Trial Chamber’s finding of Kenya’s noncompliance but 
taking no punitive action in response).
313. While certain media outlets have reported that the Prosecutor has initiated a witness 
tampering investigation into the Kenyatta and Ruto cases, to date, no formal proceedings have 
resulted from this alleged investigation. Kamore Maina, Kenya-ICC starts investigation into 
witness tampering in Kenyatta, Ruto and Sang cases, AFR. SUSTAINABLE CONSERVATION 
NEWS (Jan. 30, 2017), https://africasustainableconservation.com/2017/01/30/kenya-icc-starts-
investigation-into-witness-tampering-in-kenyatta-ruto-and-sang-cases/.
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body,”
314
to utilize stronger tools to rectify non-compliance. Article 87 al-
ready impliedly provides for the Assembly of States Parties to handle refer-
rals of non-compliance in the means it deems fit,
315
and article 112 reinforc-
es this by granting the Assembly the right to consider “any question relating 
to non-cooperation.”
316
Despite these broad delegations of power, and as ev-
idenced with the referral of Kenya, the Assembly of States Parties has taken 
a very minimal response to dealing with referred non-compliant States Par-
ties in the past. While the Assembly has issued several annual resolutions 
pertaining to the issue of state cooperation with the ICC, these appear to do 
no more than simply restate the Rome Statute’s mandatory cooperation 
scheme and call upon states to voluntarily consider strengthening their co-
operative relationships with the ICC.
317
This approach is insufficient. As ev-
idenced through past propaganda wars, States Parties will not voluntarily 
cooperate with the ICC unless doing so would promote their national self-
interests.
318
Instead, States Parties will only be prompted to cooperate under 
threat of punitive consequences.
319
Accordingly, the Assembly of States Parties should consider enacting a 
Resolution encouraging States Parties to impose bilateral economic or dip-
lomatic sanctions on States Parties whom the Trial Chamber has deemed 
non-compliant. Monetary penalties have previously proven effective in en-
forcing compliance with ICC orders. As Annie Wartanian has noted, the 
United States was able to ensure Serbian compliance with orders issued by 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia by condition-
ing foreign aid to the Former Yugoslavia on this compliance.
320
By inspiring 
States Parties to impose economic or diplomatic sanctions, States Parties 
subject to ICC investigation would be much more willing to comply, upon 
being pressured to choose between financial consequences or liability.
314. Assembly of States Parties, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/asp (last visit-
ed Sept. 18, 2020).
315. Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 87(7).
316. Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 112(2)(f).
317. See e.g., Resolution ICC-ASP/18/Res.3 Resolution on cooperation, ¶ 19 (Dec. 6, 
2019), https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP18/ICC-ASP-18-Res3-ENG.pdf (calling on 
States Parties to increase cooperation by entering into agreements with the ICC or taking pro-
tective measures to protect victims and witnesses); Resolution ICC_ASP/17/Res. 3, Resolu-
tion on cooperation (Dec. 11, 2018), https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP17/RES-3-
ENG.pdf; Resolution ICC-ASP/15/Res.3, Resolution on cooperation (Nov. 24, 2016), 
https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/ASP15/ICC-ASP-15-Res3-ENG.pdf.  
318. W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz, Political Realism in International Relations, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (May 24, 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-intl-relations/
(explaining that the realist perspective of international relations recognizes that “states act in 
pursuit of their own national interests”).
319. See BA, supra note 12, at 25 (noting that under an international relations realist per-
spective, “law is meaningful in practice only when backed by enforcement and coercion”).
320. Wartanian, supra note 309, at 1306–07.
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Moreover, encouraging States Parties’ use of sanctions through a non-
binding Assembly resolution would put the onus on the States Parties, rather 
than the ICC, to enforce compliance. Unlike the ICC, States Parties have 
enforcement mechanisms—through their military or police forces—to man-
date compliance with these sanctions. Further, non-compliant states would 
be much less willing to endanger political relationships with other states—
especially those that carry power on the geopolitical stage—than they would 
be to harm their relationship with the ICC, which has no formal recourse. 
Finally, such an approach would allow the ICC to frame one of its biggest 
weaknesses—the pervasive role of politics in Court operations—in its favor.
Again, however, such a solution is not without limitations. In order for 
States Parties to impose bilateral sanctions on non-compliant states, the ICC 
first and foremost needs to inspire these States Parties to do so by improving 
the ICC’s perceived legitimacy. Economic sanctions will also be most effec-
tively utilized by those most powerful states, which have resisted the reach 
of the ICC, such as the United States, Russia, and China.
321
The ability of 
less powerful nations to use bilateral sanctions to pressure non-compliant 
states may not carry the same level of consequence. Moreover, this bilateral 
sanction scheme would do little to enforce compliance from powerful and 
wealthy non-States Parties, like the United States. The Rome Statute only 
imposes a duty to cooperate on States Parties, leaving several of the perma-
nent members of the Security Council free to refuse to cooperate with the 
ICC without consequence.
322
However, despite these limitations, utilizing a State Party-sponsored en-
forcement mechanism for non-compliance will significantly improve the 
perceived legitimacy of the ICC throughout the globe. It will send a power-
ful message that States Parties believe so strongly in the ICC that they are 
willing to take geopolitical measures to support its operations. Not only will 
these sanctions promote the ICC’s effectiveness and ensure greater compli-
ance from investigated states, but they will further portray the ICC as a 
strong and legitimate mechanism and mitigate reputational damage caused 
by past incidents of non-compliance.
VI. CONCLUSION
The ICC will always elicit criticism, both from its States Parties and 
those states who will eternally oppose the ICC. As an undeniably quasi-
political entity, the ICC can never hope to appease all states; history has 
proven that it will be criticized when it chooses to pursue investigations as 
321. Id. at 1307 (noting that the United States’ decision to condition financial aid on 
state compliance with the ICTY was so effective because of the United States’ power and fi-
nancial wealth, and questioning whether other, less powerful states, could provide as effective 
bilateral pressure).
322. Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 87(7); Wartanian supra note 309, at 1297–98.
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well as when it declines to.
323
As an entity designed to prosecute high rank-
ing officials responsible for the worst crimes facing humanity, the ICC is 
bound to make powerful enemies who carry loud voices on the geopolitical 
stage. These enemies, like the leaders of Kenya and the Trump administra-
tion in the United States, have taken advantage of the ICC’s weaknesses by 
effectively using anti-ICC propaganda and disinformation in complement
with a refusal to cooperate with investigations. This type of approach has 
successfully worked to discredit the ICC and its Prosecutor and has ren-
dered investigations impossible.
To effectively counteract the damage that propaganda wars have caused 
to the ICC, there needs to be critical change. Yet, while fundamental modi-
fications to the Prosecutor’s selection, investigation, and prosecutorial strat-
egy are imperative, these changes alone will not solve the ICC’s problems. 
Instead, the ICC must begin to think strategically and operate in a more 
practical manner by promoting its work to the public at large, both within 
and outside of States Parties, and adapting a stronger approach to enforcing 
state compliance. These changes are critical as the ICC begins to investigate 
politically charged and highly controversial situations, including those in-
volving alleged crimes committed by the United States and Israeli nationals. 
With problematic cases on the horizon, states’ leaders will not stop seeking 
to destroy the legitimacy of the ICC. Instead, the ICC must adapt to better 
defend itself.
323. See Chile Eboe-Osuji: Can the International Criminal Court achieve its goals?
BBC SOUNDS (June 22, 2020), https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/w3cszc1y (in which Ste-
phen Sackur first criticized Judge Eboe-Osuji and the ICC for having the gall to take on the 
United States, and shortly thereafter, adamantly demanded an explanation for why the ICC 
had not pursued an investigation in Syria, a nation that is also not a State Party and one that 
has made clear that it will not support any ICC actions related to its ongoing civil war).
